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OSV ecosystem advisory

GHSA-22w3-693w-x895: webauthn-rs-core/webauthn-authenticator-rs: Origin validation mismatch possible when subdomains are allowed

Low—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 0/100)

  • The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
  • Fixed version: webauthn-authenticator-rs (crates.io) 0.6.1-dev, 0.5.5; webauthn-rs-core (crates.io) 0.6.1-dev, 0.5.5.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to webauthn-authenticator-rs (crates.io) 0.6.1-dev, 0.5.5; webauthn-rs-core (crates.io) 0.6.1-dev, 0.5.5 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: OSV

### Summary `webauthn-rs-core` ([Relying Party][rp]) and `webauthn-authenticator-rs` ([client][]) checked that [an `Origin` in `CollectedClientData`][origin] is valid for [an RP ID][rpid] with [`str::ends_with()`][ends-with], [without checking for a dot (`.`) before the RP ID when allowing subdomains][registerable-suffix]. This check is flawed, and could allow requests from an attacker-controlled domain such as `hermit-crab.example` to be accepted for the RP ID `crab.example` (assuming `.example` was publicly-registerable TLD) when the RP allows authenticating from a subdomain (disabled by default in `webauthn-rs-core` and `webauthn-rs`). [registerable-suffix]: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsers.html#is-a-registrable-domain-suffix-of-or-is-equal-to [ends-with]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/std/primitive.str.html#method.ends_with [client]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#client [rp]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#relying-party [rpid]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#rp-id [origin]: https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#dom-collectedclientdata-origin * In `webauthn-rs-core`, this **only** applies when: * [`WebauthnCore::allow_subdomains_origin`](https://docs.rs/webauthn-rs-core/0.5.4/webauthn_rs_core/struct.WebauthnCore.html#method.new_unsafe_experts_only) is `true` (the default is `false`), *and* * the attacker could register a domain that ends with the RP ID as a raw string, *and*, * the client does not implement these checks correctly either `webauthn-rs` can set `allow_subdomains_origin` via [`WebauthnBuilder::allow_subdomains`](https://docs.rs/webauthn-rs/0.5.4/webauthn_rs/struct.WebauthnBuilder.html#method.allow_subdomains). Fixing the bug in `webauthn-rs-core` also fixes it in `webauthn-rs`. * In `webauthn-authenticator-rs`, the flawed check is in [`WebauthnAuthenticator::do_registration()`](https://docs.rs/webauthn-authenticator-rs/0.5.4/webauthn_authenticator_rs/struct.WebauthnAuthenticator.html#method.do_registration) and [`do_authentication()`](https://docs.rs/webauthn-authenticator-rs/0.5.4/webauthn_authenticator_rs/struct.WebauthnAuthenticator.html#method.do_registration). A conforming [Relying Party][rp] implementation would reject such requests, but `webauthn-rs-core` did not. An application can still provide an incorrect `origin` parameter to `webauthn-authenticator-rs`, or use lower-level APIs that bypass these checks entirely, and this is by design. These issues are a violation of [WebAuthn Level 3 §13.4.9](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#sctn-validating-origin), [§5.1.3 Step 8](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#CreateCred-DetermineRpId) and [§5.1.4.1 Step 7](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#GetAssn-DetermineRpId). ### Details * `webauthn-rs-core/src/core.rs` line 1213: https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-rs-core/src/core.rs#L1211-L1216 * `webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs` line 274: https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs#L274-L277 * `webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs` line 335: https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-authenticator-rs/src/lib.rs#L335-L338 [`str::ends_with()`][ends-with] performs a raw string suffix match _without_ [enforcing a domain label boundary][registerable-suffix]: Origin | RP ID | Expected result | Result with incorrect `ends_with` check -- | -- | -- | -- `hermit-crab.example` | `crab.example` | rejected | accepted **(bug!)** `auth.crab.example` | `crab.example` | accepted | accepted (subdomain) `crab.example` | `crab.example` | accepted | accepted (exact match) `hermit-crab.example` | `auth.crab.example` | rejected | rejected `auth.crab.example` | `auth.crab.example` | accepted | accepted (exact match) ### Fix When `webauthn-rs-core` v0.5.5 checks if an `Origin` is a valid subdomain of an RP ID, it will check that it ends with the RP ID prefixed with a dot (`.{rp_id}`). `webauthn-rs` v0.5.5 will be fixed by depending on `webauthn-rs-core` v0.5.5. `webauthn-authenticator-rs` v0.5.5 now uses `webauthn-rs-core`'s checks in `WebauthnAuthenticator`. Regression tests for this bug have been added to both libraries. ### Impact With a **both** a non-conforming [client][] implementation and vulnerable version of `webauthn-rs-core` configured to allow subdomains (not the default), this bug would allow an attacker at `hermit-crab.example` to phish a target's credential for the RP ID `crab.example` by directly proxying a legitimate `navigator.credentials.get()` request on the attacker's domain. However, _conforming_ [client implementations][client] (ie: all web browsers) will refuse to process WebAuthn requests for an RP ID that does not match the `Origin` of the current page and is not [a related `Origin`](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#sctn-related-origins). In the scenario above with _conforming_ client-side checks, this would force the attacker to change the request's RP ID to `hermit-crab.example` (the attacker's `Origin`). This would also change the RP ID hash, [and `webauthn-rs-core` would reject it](https://github.com/kanidm/webauthn-rs/blob/197cddf8487a2dbdd5d374e50d80aa1e4682f3ab/webauthn-rs-core/src/core.rs#L825-L840) (per [WebAuthn §7.2 Step 15](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#rp-op-verifying-assertion-step-rpid-hash)). ### Severity Per [WebAuthn §13.4.9](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#sctn-validating-origin): > The [Relying Party](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#relying-party) MUST NOT accept unexpected values of [origin](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#dom-collectedclientdata-origin), as doing so could allow a malicious website to obtain valid [credentials](https://www.w3.org/TR/credential-management-1/#concept-credential). Although the [scope](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#scope) of WebAuthn credentials prevents their use on domains outside the [RP ID](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#rp-id) they were registered for, the [Relying Party](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#relying-party)’s origin validation serves as an additional layer of protection in case a faulty [authenticator](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#authenticator) fails to enforce credential [scope](https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-3/#scope). Unfortunately, [the chain needed to exploit this bug makes it difficult to classify with the CVSS framework](https://www.first.org/cvss/v4.0/user-guide#Vulnerability-Chaining). Kanidm came up with anywhere between "low" and "high" depending on the approach, and GitHub only provides one CVSS field for everything. An attacker could easily bypass a _correctly-implemented_ server-side `Origin` check, if they can convince a target to use their authenticator with [an attacker-controlled client device](https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-security-ref-v2.1-ps-20220523.html#dfn-t-1.3.2) or [buggy/malicious client application](https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-security-ref-v2.1-ps-20220523.html#dfn-t-1.3.1). FIDO's Security Reference [assumes that "the FIDO user device and applications involved in a FIDO operation are trustworthy agents of the user"](https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-security-ref-v2.1-ps-20220523.html#dfn-sa-4), and violating that [limits the protections FIDO can provide](https://fidoalliance.org/specs/common-specs/fido-security-ref-v2.1-ps-20220523.html#discussion), so it would be ridiculous to describe those bypasses as a "high" severity vulnerability. However, `webauthn-rs-core` should take reasonable steps to prevent these sorts of issues where it can, especially when they're part of the WebAuthn specification. Due to the complex preconditions and non-default configuration required to execute a successful attack, and that it is *not exploitable* in popular web browsers, Kanidm considers this a **low severity** issue.

Published
May 6, 2026
Updated
Sep 10, 2026
EPSS
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Action score

0

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
0 / 40 · —
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · —

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Noroxi analysis

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Affected systems

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VendorProduct
crates.iowebauthn-rs-core
crates.iowebauthn-authenticator-rs

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
crates.iowebauthn-authenticator-rsfrom 0.6.0-dev · before 0.6.1-dev0.6.1-dev
crates.iowebauthn-authenticator-rsbefore 0.5.50.5.5
crates.iowebauthn-rs-corefrom 0.6.0-dev · before 0.6.1-dev0.6.1-dev
crates.iowebauthn-rs-corebefore 0.5.50.5.5

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
crates.io:webauthn-authenticator-rs0.5.5Package registry (OSV)
crates.io:webauthn-authenticator-rs0.6.1-devPackage registry (OSV)
crates.io:webauthn-rs-core0.5.5Package registry (OSV)
crates.io:webauthn-rs-core0.6.1-devPackage registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
P

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

osv

Attack context

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