CVE-2026-90590: Permanent loss of transmit capability in the NXP ENET QoS Ethernet driver after an Ethernet link drop
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.17% (FIRST EPSS).
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: zephyrproject zephyr 4.3.2, 4.5.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to zephyrproject zephyr 4.3.2, 4.5.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
The NXP ENET QoS Ethernet driver in drivers/ethernet/eth_nxp_enet_qos serialises transmission with a binary semaphore, data->tx.tx_sem, taken in eth_nxp_enet_qos_tx() and returned only by the transmit-completion interrupt handler tx_dma_done(). A frame that has been handed to the transmit DMA when the Ethernet link goes down is never written back, so that completion interrupt never arrives. The PHY callback eth_nxp_enet_qos_phy_cb() reacts to carrier loss only by calling net_eth_carrier_set(); it does not stop the DMA, take the descriptors back or release the outstanding frame, and no timeout exists to do so. The trigger is a link-down/link-up transition that lands while a frame is under the transmit DMA. It can be produced by anyone who controls the link partner or the cable — for example by administratively downing and restoring the attached switch port, or by restarting auto-negotiation from a peer device — and can be made reliable by generating traffic that keeps the device transmitting and repeating the transition. No credentials or user interaction are required, and the trigger is at the link layer rather than over IP. Because the semaphore is never given back, every subsequent call to eth_nxp_enet_qos_tx() fails with -EBUSY for the remaining life of the boot; restoring the link does not recover the interface, since the link-up path only rewrites MAC_CONFIGURATION. The affected interface continues to receive but can no longer transmit anything — no ARP replies, no TCP acknowledgements, no DHCP renewals — until the device is reset. The net_pkt and the net_buf fragments of the abandoned frame are likewise never unreferenced and never return to their pools. The security-relevant property is persistence: a momentary link flap leaves the interface permanently unable to send, so the denial of service outlasts the attacker's access to the link. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact. The fix adds a claim/release pair around the outstanding packet so that completion and abandonment are mutually exclusive, aborts an outstanding frame from the PHY callback on carrier loss (stopping the DMA, flushing the MTL transmit queue and reinitialising the descriptor ring), and arms a transmit watchdog, CONFIG_ETH_NXP_ENET_QOS_TX_TIMEOUT_MS, so that any non-completing DMA — not only a carrier loss — reclaims the transmit slot and the packet.
- Published
- Nov 9, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 9, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 7th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-772
Report tools
Action score
26
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · zephyr
- 6.5
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (zephyr). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
zephyrproject zephyr
- 3.7.0 and later · before 4.3.2affected · semver
- 4.4.0 and later · before 4.5.0affected · semver
Same product
zephyrproject: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2023-4260Potential off-by-one buffer overflow vulnerability in the Zephyr FS subsystem40Plan
- CVE-2021-3625Buffer overflow in Zephyr USB DFU DNLOAD40Plan
- CVE-2020-10071Insufficient publish message length validation in MQTT40Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-90588Nov 9, 2026 · Out-of-bounds read in Zephyr HTTP client debug logging of response header fields14Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-90589Nov 9, 2026 · Memory-mapped thread stack is never unmapped when a thread is aborted by another thread, exhausting kernel virtual address space22Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-90591Nov 9, 2026 · NXP ENET-QOS Ethernet driver re-arms RX descriptors with a clobbered DMA buffer address on packet drop30Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject zephyr | 4.3.2 | Vendor (CNA) |
| zephyrproject zephyr | 4.5.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 11, 2026+1 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-13351137 days apartnet: Maliciously fragmented IPv6 packets can prevent receiving/processing future incoming packets30Monitor
- CVE-2026-1993727 days apartBluetooth Mesh Access layer permanently leaks delayable-message contexts, disabling all model responses22Monitor
- CVE-2026-8103914 days apartBluetooth Host connection reservation leak when multiple connectable advertising sets share an identity17Monitor
- CVE-2026-1181191 days apartSocket file-descriptor leak in UpdateHub OTA client start_coap_client() leading to resource-exhaustion DoS14Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-772 · Missing Release of Resource after Effective LifetimeCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
Change log
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.