Stack overflow in nscd due to unbounded alloca use
The nscd service in the GNU C Library 2.3.4 onwards may crash due to a stack overflow when a malicious DNS server returns too large a response for a DNS query, resulting in degraded DNS resolution for the system. Exploitation of this bug needs a system that has nscd enabled and using an untrusted DNS server for name resolution, with the compromised DNS server being capable of processing records large enough to result in a stack overflow in an nscd thread stack. During experimentation, bind 9 was unable to handle large records, but that could change in future or with a different name server. In typical installations, nscd is executed in an isolated context as its own user without a shell, due to which any compromise of that service is isolated. There is a remote possibility of nscd cache corruption if an attacker manages to get the stack pointer into a desired point in the heap, potentially resulting in other caches in nscd being overwritten with corrupt data through the stack overflow, until the buggy code path eventually results in a crash. Finally, a crash in nscd may result in performance degradation when resolving names, but it does not result in a denial of service.
- Published
- Sep 10, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 11, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 17th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-789
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Report tools
Action score
16
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 16 / 40 · 4.2 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · glibc
- 4.2
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (glibc). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
The GNU C Library glibc
- 2.3.4 and later · before 2.45affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | glibc | all versions | — |
Same product
the gnu c library: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
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- CVE-2026-86805AT_SECURE programs may load attacker-controlled code via $ORIGIN25Monitor
- CVE-2025-0395When the assert() function in the GNU C Library versions 2.13 to 2.40 fails, it does not allocate enough space for the assertion failure mes24Monitor
- CVE-2026-80489EUC_JISX0213 decoding may hang on crafted input23Monitor
- CVE-2026-77117SHIFT_JISX0213 decoding may hang on crafted input23Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| azl3 glibc 2.38-21 on Azure Linux 3.0 | Release Notes | Microsoft (MSRC) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Anmol Singh Rajputfinder
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- low · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- Low
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-789 · Memory Allocation with Excessive Size ValueCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=34624
- sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob_plain;f=advisories/GLIBC-SA-2026-0016
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/11/2
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.