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CVE-2026-85530· NVD / CVE Program· CNA WPScan

GiveWP < 4.16.8.1 - Unauthenticated Account Takeover via Donor Email Sanitization Mismatch

The GiveWP WordPress plugin before 4.16.8.1 does not consistently normalise a donor's e-mail address between the value it stores and the value it later uses to look that donor up, allowing unauthenticated users to be resolved as an arbitrary donor and to set the WordPress password of any user account linked to one, including an administrator's.

HighCVSS 8.1 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Sep 16, 2026
Updated
Sep 17, 2026
EPSS
0.4% · 30th percentile
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JSON

Action score

32

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.4%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (WPScan). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Unknown GiveWP

    • 4.16.6 and later · before 4.16.8.1affected · semver

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-14319GiveWP < 4.16.3 - Unauthenticated Recurring Donor Information Disclosure
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-14318GiveWP < 4.16.3 - GiveWP Worker+ Stored XSS via Donation Form Template Settings
    27Monitor
  • CVE-2026-85113GiveWP < 4.16.9 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary Shortcode Execution via Donor Name
    26Monitor
  • CVE-2026-14317GiveWP < 4.16.3 - Unauthenticated Payment Gateway Restriction Bypass
    21Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Unknown GiveWP4.16.8.1Vendor (CNA)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
High
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-secondary

Root cause

To simplify setup, a service account is granted broad, cluster-wide permissions. The principle of least privilege is skipped during installation.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

yaml
kind: ClusterRolerules:  - apiGroups: ["*"]    resources: ["*"]    verbs: ["*"]

Fixed

yaml
kind: Rolemetadata:  namespace: lodos-systemrules:  - apiGroups: ["apps"]    resources: ["deployments"]    verbs: ["get", "list", "update"]

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

We use this product, ask for help

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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