CVE-2026-82704: Apache Wicket: A listener is invoked on a page instance the request itself created and never configured
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 27/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.25% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Wicket 8.20.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Wicket 8.20.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Missing authorization in Apache Wicket. org.apache.wicket.core.request.handler.ListenerRequestHandler invokes an IRequestListener only when org.apache.wicket.Component#canCallListener() allows it, and that method is isEnabledInHierarchy() && isVisibleInHierarchy(). The visibility half reads a flag that carries the outcome of IAuthorizationStrategy#isActionAuthorized() for the Component.RENDER action, and that flag is written in one place only, Component#configure(), during the render phase. A listener URL built by a subclass of org.apache.wicket.core.request.mapper.AbstractBookmarkableMapper carries the page identifier and the component path in a single parameter, and the page identifier may be empty. When it is, a new page instance is constructed, PageProvider#wasExpired() is false because no identifier was supplied, and PageAndComponentProvider#getComponent() finds the component directly on the new instance, so neither a render pass nor Component#configure() runs before the listener is invoked. The flag therefore still holds its constructor default, the component counts as visible, and the listener of a component the authorization strategy denied RENDER for is executed. The same request also skips Component#onConfigure(), so visibility and enablement an application sets there are not applied either. There are two ways to reach this, and neither requires anything but a request. On a page that is stateful, the caller omits the page identifier from a listener URL that would otherwise carry it. On a page that Wicket considers stateless, nothing has to be altered at all: Wicket itself writes listener URLs without a page identifier for such pages, and a component the strategy denies RENDER for is treated as stateless and therefore does not keep the page stateful, so denying RENDER can itself produce the page-id-less form. The second route has never been refused. The ENABLE decision of IAuthorizationStrategy is consulted on every invocation and still refuses, as does a request that supplies the real identifier of a page instance that has already been rendered; a component the application disabled in Component#onConfigure() is protected by neither, because that callback has not run. An application is affected where it withholds an individual component from the caller, either by denying the RENDER action through IAuthorizationStrategy, including through the MetaDataRoleAuthorizationStrategy and AuthorizeAction facilities of wicket-auth-roles, or by setting the component's visibility or enabled flag in Component#onConfigure(), the callback Wicket's own documentation directs applications to use for both. The page carrying such a component has to be constructible from a bookmarkable or mounted URL, which requires a public constructor taking either no arguments or a PageParameters argument. Behaviours pass through the same gate, so an AJAX behaviour attached to such a component is equally exposed. Separately, and whether or not any component is withheld, a listener on a page Wicket considers stateful is invoked on an instance the request itself constructed, so it acts on models built from page parameters the caller supplied rather than on the state the application last rendered. Instantiation authorization is unaffected: IAuthorizationStrategy#isInstantiationAuthorized() is still consulted when the new page instance is created, so a guard placed on the page rather than on the individual component continues to hold. This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 8.0.0 through 8.19.0, from 9.0.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 8.20.0, 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue.
- Published
- Nov 1, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 6, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.2% · 16th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-862
Report tools
Action score
27
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 27 / 40 · 6.9 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.2%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · apache
- 6.9
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apache Software Foundation Apache Wicket
- 8.0.0 and later · up to and including 8.19.0affected · semver
- 9.0.0 and later · up to and including 9.24.0affected · semver
- 10.0.0 and later · up to and including 10.11.0affected · semver
Same product
apache software foundation: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-84170Apache Wicket: Configured upload limits are not enforced by the standalone file upload resource33Monitor
- CVE-2026-83594Apache Wicket: FileUploadToResourceField accepts a client-asserted upload result and allocates the size it names33Monitor
- CVE-2026-95863Apache Wicket: XSS via a component id or markup id written unescaped into generated JavaScript and markup30Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-82558Nov 1, 2026 · Apache Wicket: WebSocketBehavior delivers client messages to a component the client may not invoke9Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-82559Nov 1, 2026 · Apache Wicket: WebSocket messages are processed against an HTTP session snapshot that survives invalidation9Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-82705Nov 1, 2026 · Apache Wicket: The configured authorization strategy is not applied to an IResource embedded in a component25Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Wicket | 8.20.0 · description | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 13, 2026+12 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Emond Papegaaijfinder
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-825570 days apartApache Wicket: A disabled or invisible form submitting component is still invoked on a plain form submission27Monitor
- CVE-2026-821150 days apartApache Wicket: The configured authorization strategy is not applied to a shared WebSocketResource25Monitor
- CVE-2026-827050 days apartApache Wicket: The configured authorization strategy is not applied to an IResource embedded in a component25Monitor
- CVE-2026-825580 days apartApache Wicket: WebSocketBehavior delivers client messages to a component the client may not invoke9Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: patch commit or PR link · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-862 · Missing AuthorizationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → none
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.