NVD / CVE Program· CNA apache

CVE-2026-82428: Apache Storm Client: Cross-Tenant Dependency Jar Substitution via Predictable Blob Keys

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 35/100)

The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.69% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 53.2% of all records.
Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Storm Client 3.1.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Storm Client 3.1.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

Description Dependency artifacts uploaded with `storm jar --artifacts` were stored under a blob key derived only from the Maven coordinate, for example `dep---.jar`. The key was therefore identical for every user of the cluster and predictable in advance. When the blob already existed, the uploader caught `KeyAlreadyExistsException` and silently reused it, with no check that the existing blob's content or owner matched the artifact the submitter had resolved. A user who uploaded a blob under such a key first therefore controlled the bytes that every later submitter of the same coordinate would receive on the worker classpath, resulting in code execution inside another tenant's topology. This affects deployments where more than one principal may create blobs and where the `--artifacts` dependency feature is used. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where each uploaded artifact receives a key carrying a freshly generated UUID and a pre-existing blob is no longer silently reused. Note that the corrected key generation is on the SUBMITTING CLIENT, so upgrading the cluster alone does not close this; every client that runs `storm jar --artifacts` must also be upgraded. Operators should audit existing `dep-` blobs for unexpected owners before upgrading. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should avoid the `--artifacts` mechanism in multi-tenant clusters and distribute dependencies inside the topology jar instead. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

HighCVSS 8.8 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Path traversal

EUVD-2026-77529

Published: Sep 14, 2026
Updated: Sep 14, 2026
EPSS: 0.6% · 53th percentile
CWE: CWE-22

Report tools

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Action score

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS: 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
CISA KEV: 0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS: 0 / 30 · 0.6%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical impact: total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

Get told when this record changes

Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
No public exploit code on record
A fix has been released

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

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Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

Apache Software Foundation Apache Storm Client
- 3.0.0 and later · before 3.1.0affected · semver

Same product

apache software foundation: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

CVE-2026-82431Apache Storm Client: Authorization Bypass When nimbus.groups Is Configured Without nimbus.users
39Monitor
CVE-2026-82436Apache Storm Client: Deserialization of Untrusted Data from the State Store
0Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / package	Fixed version	Source
Apache Software Foundation Apache Storm Client	3.1.0	Vendor (CNA)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

The ASF using Claude Agentsfinder

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

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Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
A low-privileged account is enough.
No user action is required.
No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality: high · data can be read
Integrity: high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability: high · the service can be disrupted

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality impact: High
Integrity impact: High
Availability impact: High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-secondary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-22 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

1const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);
2res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

1const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);
2if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {
3  return res.sendStatus(400);
4}
5res.sendFile(file);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

ATT&CK techniques

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Change log

Fix✗ → ✓Sep 28, 2026, 10:08 PM UTC

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References

lists.apache.org/thread/pj3fspp4l10fgk2jkvrnqsmxycmjv622

Show all references (1 more)

www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/8

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

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