Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes <= 5.26.0 - Authenticated (Subscriber+) Account Takeover via Missing Authorization on Event Reaction En
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.58% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- No fixed version is recorded, but the references include a patch (commit or PR) link.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. See the fix and affected versions sections below.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
The Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authenticated (Subscriber+) account takeover in all versions up to, and including, 5.26.0 via the event reaction endpoints (react_to_event() / unreact_to_event()). The endpoints register get_items_permissions_check() as their permission_callback, which only verifies the requester is logged in and does not enforce the per-logger capability checks normally applied by Log_Query. As a result, a Subscriber-level user can POST to /wp-json/simple-history/v1/events/<id>/react with the _fields=context query parameter and read the full context of any Simple History event — including SimpleUserLogger entries that record the full password-reset email body (reset URL with the reset key) for any user. The attacker triggers a password reset for an administrator via the lost-password form, brute-forces recent event IDs through the reaction endpoint to read the resulting user_requested_password_reset_link event, extracts the reset key from context.message, and completes the password reset to take over the administrator account. Exploitation requires an administrator to have first enabled the experimental features option (simple_history_experimental_features_enabled), which is not the default.
- Published
- May 30, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 22, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.5% · 46th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-640
Report tools
Action score
30
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.5%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · Wordfence
- 7.5
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Wordfence). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
eskapism Simple History – Track, Log, and Audit WordPress Changes
- up to and including 5.26.0affected · semver
Same product
eskapism: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2025-5760Simple History <= 5.8.1 - Authenticated (Administrator+) Sensitive Information Exposure via Detective Mode19Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-06-17 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+18 d
- TodayOct 20, 2026+143 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Ly Hoangfinder
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-0287 · Jun 2, 2026(WordPress Eklenti Güvenlik Bildirimi)
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-640 · Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten PasswordCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (11 more)Show less
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-history/tags/5.26.0/inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php#L1215
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-history/tags/5.26.0/inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php#L1420
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-history/tags/5.26.0/inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php#L1460
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-history/tags/5.26.0/inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php#L778
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-history/trunk/inc/class-event.php#L613
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-history/trunk/inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php#L1215
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-history/trunk/inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php#L1420
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-history/trunk/inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php#L1460
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/simple-history/trunk/inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php#L778
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3524112/simple-history/trunk/inc/class-wp-rest-events-controller.php
- www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/95d2bf1a-0993-4553-a00e-6f555c3f15be?source=cve
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.