CVE-2026-72704: Rocq Prover through 9.2.0 Guard Checker Trusts Corrupted Recursive Tree After Transport
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 27/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.17% (FIRST EPSS).
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. No account or password is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- No fixed version is recorded, but the references include a patch (commit or PR) link.
Low priority for now. See the fix and affected versions sections below.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
The guard checker in Rocq Prover does not recheck the recursive tree representation of an inductive type parameter after that parameter has been changed by transport. A fixpoint may apply a rewrite along an equality between types to its recursive argument, which the guard checker accepts because the inductive type is preserved, while the recursive tree recorded for the parameter is altered. A second fixpoint that calls the first inherits the altered recursive tree without verification, so a call that is not structurally decreasing is accepted as terminating. The resulting non-terminating definition proves that a natural number equals its own successor and therefore False, from which any proposition follows. The demonstration uses two axioms that follow from univalence and are consistent with the calculus of inductive constructions, so the contradiction comes from the guard check rather than from the assumptions. A fix is proposed but not merged.
- Published
- Aug 24, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 26, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 7th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-670
Report tools
Action score
27
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 27 / 40 · 6.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · VulnCheck
- 6.8
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- No fixed version yet
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (VulnCheck). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
rocq-prover rocq
- up to and including 9.2.0affected
Same product
rocq-prover: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-72714Rocq Prover through 9.2.0 Universe Checking State Desynchronised After Module Close27Monitor
- CVE-2026-72705Rocq Prover before 9.2.0 Guard Checker Accepts Fixpoint Passed as a Higher-Order Argument27Monitor
- CVE-2026-72703Rocq Prover 8.20 before 9.2.0 Guard Checker Accepts Non-Terminating Fixpoint via Unchecked Cross-Calls27Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2020-37268Aug 24, 2026 · Coq and Rocq Prover Print Assumptions Omits Unsafe Universe Checking Inlined Through Parameter Inline27Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-08-23 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- First PoC-2 d
- Published
- TodayNov 7, 2026+74 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Yann Lerayfinder
- Jonathan Brossard (MOABI)finder
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-727030 days apartRocq Prover 8.20 before 9.2.0 Guard Checker Accepts Non-Terminating Fixpoint via Unchecked Cross-Calls27Monitor
- CVE-2026-727050 days apartRocq Prover before 9.2.0 Guard Checker Accepts Fixpoint Passed as a Higher-Order Argument27Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- P
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-670 · Always-Incorrect Control Flow ImplementationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Exploit maturitynone → poc
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References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.