CVE-2026-71892: CMS key-transport recipient key-size validation never runs for RFC 9709 HKDF-derived keys
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 27/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.17% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-FJA 2.0.13, 2.1.13; Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA 1.86.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-FJA 2.0.13, 2.1.13; Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA 1.86 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In Bouncy Castle for Java before 1.86, the opt-in key-size validation on CMS key-transport recipients, org.bouncycastle.cms.jcajce.JceKeyTransRecipient.setKeySizeValidation(true), never ran for a message using RFC 9709 content-encryption key derivation (id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256). The branch that should have selected the actual content-encryption algorithm carried in the key derivation AlgorithmIdentifier's parameters compared the encrypted-key byte array against the id-alg-cek-hkdf-sha256 object identifier, a comparison between a byte array and an ASN1ObjectIdentifier that is false for every possible input, so the check fell through to a key-size lookup on the outer wrapper OID. That OID identifies a key-derivation construction rather than a cipher and has no registered key size, so the size comparison was skipped entirely. A key-transport EnvelopedData or AuthEnvelopedData whose transported, HKDF-derived content-encryption key did not match the key size of the advertised content-encryption algorithm was therefore accepted even with validation explicitly enabled, silently defeating the only mechanism the API offers for enforcing recovered key size. The recipient now dispatches on the content-encryption AlgorithmIdentifier's algorithm OID, so validation checks the recovered key against the inner content-encryption algorithm. Messages with a matching key size, non-HKDF messages, and recipients that do not enable validation are unaffected. This issue also affects Bouncy Castle for Java FIPS (BC-FJA) before bcpkix-fips 2.0.13 (2.0.X series) and 2.1.13 (2.1.X series).
- Published
- Oct 3, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 6, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 6th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-697
Report tools
Action score
27
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 27 / 40 · 6.9 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · bcorg
- 6.9
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Amber
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (bcorg). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-FJA
- 2.0.7 and later · before 2.0.13affected · maven
- 2.1.0 and later · before 2.1.13affected · maven
Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA
- 1.78 and later · before 1.86affected · maven
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | bouncycastle | from 0 | — |
| Debian:14 | bouncycastle | before 1.86-1 | 1.86-1 |
| openSUSE:Tumbleweed | bouncycastle | before 1.86-1.1 | 1.86-1.1 |
| SUSE:Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP7 | bouncycastle | before 1.86-150200.3.41.1 | 1.86-150200.3.41.1 |
Same product
legion of the bouncy castle inc.: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2025-14813GOSTCTR implementation unable to process more than 255 blocks correctly37Monitor
- CVE-2026-71885MLS X.509 credential not bound to the LeafNode signature key36Monitor
- CVE-2026-5598Non-constant time comparisons risk private key leakage in FrodoKEM.35Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-71890Oct 3, 2026 · MLS external commit can remove an arbitrary group member34Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-71891Oct 3, 2026 · BLS12-381 key validation accepts a public key built on a foreign curve28Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-85515Oct 3, 2026 · OpenPGP message truncation not reported, bypassing the SEIPDv1 integrity check32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-FJA | 2.0.13 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-FJA | 2.1.13 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. BC-JAVA | 1.86 | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:bouncycastle | 1.86-1 · Debian:14 | Package registry (OSV) |
| opensuse:bouncycastle | 1.86-1.1 · openSUSE:Tumbleweed | Package registry (OSV) |
| suse:bouncycastle | 1.86-150200.3.41.1 · SUSE:Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP7 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayOct 26, 2026+24 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-697 · Incorrect ComparisonCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Amber
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Buffer Overflow via Environment VariablesCAPEC-10likelihood: High · High
- Double EncodingCAPEC-120likelihood: Low · Medium
- Client-side Injection-induced Buffer OverflowCAPEC-14likelihood: Medium · High
- Command DelimitersCAPEC-15likelihood: High · High
- Flash InjectionCAPEC-182likelihood: High · Medium
- Filter Failure through Buffer OverflowCAPEC-24likelihood: High · High
- Leverage Alternate EncodingCAPEC-267likelihood: High · High
- Using Leading 'Ghost' Character Sequences to Bypass Input FiltersCAPEC-3likelihood: Medium · Medium
ATT&CK techniques
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → none
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.