Potential privilege escalation to JFrog administrator privileges
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 35/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.36% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Incorrect authorization validation in refresh token signature allows non-admin users to obtain a signed JFrog administrator token.
- Published
- Jul 27, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 30, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.4% · 29th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-347
Report tools
Action score
35
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.4%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · JFROG
- 8.8
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- No fixed version yet
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| jfrog | artifactory | cpe:2.3:a:jfrog:artifactory |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- jfrog artifactorybefore 7.146.27
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (JFROG). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
jfrog artifactory
- before 7.146.27affected
Same product
jfrog: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-82329Potential authentication bypass leading to administrative access in ArtifactoryKEV73This week
- CVE-2026-42016Incorrect authorization validation of user token in JFrog Artifactory allows Privilege EscalationKEV68This week
- CVE-2026-42018Anonymous user token generation exposure in JFrog ArtifactoryKEV63This week
- CVE-2019-17444JFrog Artifactory does not enforce default admin password change60This week
- CVE-2019-9733An issue was discovered in JFrog Artifactory 6.7.3.55Plan
- CVE-2026-66384Authenticated users may write data outside the intended Docker cache pathKEV51Plan
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×2
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:1 | 2026-09-17 |
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:1 | 2026-09-19 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+51 d
- TodayOct 14, 2026+79 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Kostya KortchinskyOpenAIfinder
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-6875716 days apartPotential improper SAML signature verification in JFrog Artifactory30Monitor
- CVE-2026-6875916 days apartIntegration credential holders may impersonate users in JFrog Access28Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-0651 · Jul 28, 2026(JFrog Artifactory/Platform Güvenlik Bildirimi)
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, { algorithms: ["RS256"], issuer: "https://id.example.com", audience: "portal",});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.