CVE-2026-6440: GoodMeet <= 1.1.8 - Cross-Site Request Forgery to Google Meet Credential Reset via 'goodmeet_reset_google_meet_credential'
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 17/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.20% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
The GoodMeet – Google Meet Integration for Webinar, Meeting & Video Conference plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to and including 1.1.8. This is due to a missing nonce verification in the reset_credential() function, which handles the wp_ajax_goodmeet_reset_google_meet_credential AJAX action. While the function does verify the user's capability (manage_options), it does not validate a nonce, making it susceptible to CSRF attacks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trick a site administrator into clicking a malicious link that will reset (delete) the plugin's stored Google Meet API credentials (goodmeet_google_credentials) and OAuth tokens (goodmeet_google_token), effectively disabling the Google Meet integration on the site.
- Published
- Jul 10, 2026
- Updated
- Jul 10, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.2% · 10th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-352
Report tools
Action score
17
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 17 / 40 · 4.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.2%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · Wordfence
- 4.3
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Is GoodMeet – Google Meet Integration for Webinar, Meeting & Video Conference on your site?
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Wordfence). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
sovlix GoodMeet – Google Meet Integration for Webinar, Meeting & Video Conference
- up to and including 1.1.8affected · semver
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-08-15 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+36 d
- TodayOct 28, 2026+110 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Legion HunterPatchstack Bug Bounty programfinder
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-352 · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
nvd-secondary
Root cause
State-changing requests rely on the session cookie the browser sends automatically; nothing verifies that the request came from the user’s own page.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-352 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true } }));
app.post("/account/address", updateAddress);Fixed
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax" } }));
app.post("/account/address", csrfProtection, updateAddress);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (7 more)Show less
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/goodmeet/tags/1.1.6/includes/Goodmeet_Ajax.php#L38
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/goodmeet/tags/1.1.6/includes/Googlemeet/Goodmeet_Meet.php#L544
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/goodmeet/trunk/includes/Goodmeet_Ajax.php#L140
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/goodmeet/trunk/includes/Goodmeet_Ajax.php#L38
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/goodmeet/trunk/includes/Googlemeet/Goodmeet_Meet.php#L544
- plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=&old=3525854%40goodmeet&new=3525854%40goodmeet
- www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/dc9e818d-811e-4732-9c74-8eb6753a1706?source=cve
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.