CVE-2026-63505: Probo: Cross-tenant IDOR via unvalidated FK references
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 19/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (Exploit-DB); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: getprobo probo 0.223.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to getprobo probo 0.223.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Probo is a self-hostable governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) platform built for engineering and security teams. Prior to version 0.223.1, Probo's console GraphQL API is a multi-tenant GRC platform where all data is scoped to an organization. A Finding can reference a Risk via finding.riskId. That reference is stored without validating that the risk belongs to the caller's organization, and the Finding.risk field resolver authorizes the finding (caller's org) instead of the risk, then loads the risk with a tenant scope derived from the risk's own global ID. As a result, an authenticated member of organization A can attach an arbitrary organization B risk GID to a finding they own and then read organization B's Risk (name, description, treatment, category, severity, owner) — with no membership in B. The stored cross-tenant reference also blocks B from deleting its own risk (ON DELETE RESTRICT), a cross-tenant integrity/DoS. This issue has been patched in version 0.223.1.
- Published
- Nov 11, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 11, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-639
Report tools
Action score
19
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 19 / 40 · 4.9 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 4.9
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
getprobo probo
- < 0.223.1affected
Same product
getprobo: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-76079Probo: Vertical privilege escalation28Monitor
- CVE-2026-49820Probo has an open redirect bypass via path normalization18Monitor
- CVE-2026-64861Probo: GraphQL Alias-Based Application Layer Denial of Service (DoS)17Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →CVE-2026-76078Nov 11, 2026 · Probo: Broken access control in public e-signature API12Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-76080Nov 11, 2026 · Probo: Unauthenticated cross-tenant and hidden-item disclosure via Query.node in the public Trust Center API14Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| getprobo probo | 0.223.1 · description | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Exploit-DB entry ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Exploit-DB entry | webapps | 2026-08-17 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- First PoC-87 d
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 12, 2026same day
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-760780 days apartProbo: Broken access control in public e-signature API12Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled KeyCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
nvd-secondary
Root cause
The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-639 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);
res.json(invoice);Fixed
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({
id: req.params.id,
ownerId: req.user.id,
});
if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);
res.json(invoice);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Exploit maturity— → poc
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.