CVE-2026-6092: Encrypt-then-MAC could fall back to MAC-then-Encrypt when HAVE_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC is configured
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 8/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.38% (FIRST EPSS).
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: wolfssl (Debian:12) 5.5.4-2+deb12u3; wolfssl (Debian:13) 5.7.2-0.1+deb13u2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to wolfssl (Debian:12) 5.5.4-2+deb12u3; wolfssl (Debian:13) 5.7.2-0.1+deb13u2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
When HAVE_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC is configured, the implementation could fall back to MAC-then-Encrypt rather than enforcing Encrypt-then-MAC.
- Published
- Jun 25, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 27, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 32th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-757
Report tools
Action score
8
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 8 / 40 · 2.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · wolfSSL
- 2.1
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/U:Clear
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| wolfssl | wolfssl | cpe:2.3:a:wolfssl:wolfssl |
Check your server's TLS configuration
The wolfSSL version can't be seen from outside; the free SSL checker tests your certificate, enabled TLS versions and weak ciphers. Confirm the version on your server with the package manager.
Run the SSL checkAffected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- wolfssl wolfssl5.2.0 and later · before 5.9.2
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (wolfSSL). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
wolfSSL wolfSSL
- 5.2.0 and later · up to and including 5.9.1affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | wolfssl | before 5.5.4-2+deb12u3 | 5.5.4-2+deb12u3 |
| Debian:13 | wolfssl | before 5.7.2-0.1+deb13u2 | 5.7.2-0.1+deb13u2 |
Same product
wolfssl: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2017-13099wolfSSL Bleichenbacher/ROBOT60This week
- CVE-2019-11873wolfSSL 4.0.0 has a Buffer Overflow in DoPreSharedKeys in tls13.c when a current identity size is greater than a client identity size.42Plan
- CVE-2017-2800A specially crafted x509 certificate can cause a single out of bounds byte overwrite in wolfSSL through 3.10.2 resulting in potential certif42Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-11703Jun 25, 2026 · Missing SNI/ALPN binding on stateful (session-ID) TLS session resumption24Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-55962Jun 25, 2026 · TLS 1.3 post-handshake authentication: server accepts Finished without client Certificate/CertificateVerify24Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-6325Jun 25, 2026 · Out-of-bounds write in SetSuitesHashSigAlgo on oversized signature algorithms list8Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| debian:wolfssl | 5.5.4-2+deb12u3 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-757 · Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Clear
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.