CVE-2026-58269: Sync-in Server has a complete 2FA Bypass via `POST /api/auth/token`
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.27% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: @sync-in/server (npm) 2.4.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @sync-in/server (npm) 2.4.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Sync-in Server is an open-source platform for file storage, sharing, collaboration, and syncing. Prior to version 2.4.0, `POST /api/auth/token` authenticates with username and password only, then calls `getTokens()`, which returns full access and refresh JWTs without checking whether the account has TOTP 2FA enabled. An attacker with stolen or phished credentials can bypass 2FA in a single request. The parallel login endpoint (`POST /api/auth/login`) correctly enforces 2FA by calling `setCookies(user, res, true)`, which gates on `user.twoFaEnabled`. Version 2.4.0 patches the issue.
- Published
- Sep 21, 2026
- Updated
- Sep 24, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.2% · 20th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-288
Report tools
Action score
32
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.2%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 8.1
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Sync-in server
- < 2.4.0affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | @sync-in/server | before 2.4.0 | 2.4.0 |
Same product
sync-in: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-47684Sync-in Server: SSRF protection bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses in regExpPrivateIP30Monitor
- CVE-2026-58271@sync-in/server vulnerable to TOTP Brute-Force via `POST /api/app/sync/register`27Monitor
- CVE-2026-58270Sync-in Server has a ReDoS via Unsanitized Regex in Sync Diff `pathFilters`26Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →CVE-2026-58272Sep 21, 2026 · Sync-in Server has Username/Login Enumeration via Timing Side-Channel on POST /api/auth/login (incomplete fix of the prior timing-attack advisory)21Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| npm:@sync-in/server | 2.4.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
- CVE-2026-4768497 days apartSync-in Server: SSRF protection bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses in regExpPrivateIP30Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-288 · Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or ChannelCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.