CVE-2026-55961: wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() reports success for degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 with no signer
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.14% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: wolfssl (Alpine:v3.24) 5.9.2-r0; wolfssl (Debian:12) 5.5.4-2+deb12u3; wolfssl (Debian:13) 5.7.2-0.1+deb13u2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to wolfssl (Alpine:v3.24) 5.9.2-r0; wolfssl (Debian:12) 5.5.4-2+deb12u3; wolfssl (Debian:13) 5.7.2-0.1+deb13u2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
wolfSSL_PKCS7_verify() returning success for a degenerate (certs-only) PKCS#7 object that contains no signer. Such an object has empty signerInfos, so the underlying signed-data verification succeeds without authenticating any content. The compatibility-layer verify path now rejects the object when no signer signature has actually been verified, so a PKCS#7 carrying no valid signature is no longer reported as verified. This is enforced regardless of the PKCS7_NOVERIFY flag, which only suppresses signer certificate chain validation and was never intended to waive the requirement that a signature exist. Only affects OpenSSL compatibility builds that call the PKCS7_verify() compatibility API on potentially degenerate PKCS#7 bundles.
- Published
- Jun 25, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 26, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 3th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-347
Report tools
Action score
32
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 32 / 40 · 8.2 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · wolfSSL
- 8.2
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Check your server's TLS configurationRun the SSL check
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| wolfssl | wolfssl | cpe:2.3:a:wolfssl:wolfssl |
Check your server's TLS configuration
The wolfSSL version can't be seen from outside; the free SSL checker tests your certificate, enabled TLS versions and weak ciphers. Confirm the version on your server with the package manager.
Run the SSL checkVersions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (wolfSSL). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
wolfSSL wolfSSL
- 3.15.7 and later · up to and including 5.9.1affected · semver
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- wolfssl wolfssl3.15.7 and later · before 5.9.2
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alpine:v3.24 | wolfssl | from 3.15.7 · before 5.9.2-r0 | 5.9.2-r0 |
| Debian:12 | wolfssl | before 5.5.4-2+deb12u3 | 5.5.4-2+deb12u3 |
| Debian:13 | wolfssl | before 5.7.2-0.1+deb13u2 | 5.7.2-0.1+deb13u2 |
Same product
wolfssl: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2017-13099wolfSSL Bleichenbacher/ROBOT60This week
- CVE-2019-11873wolfSSL 4.0.0 has a Buffer Overflow in DoPreSharedKeys in tls13.c when a current identity size is greater than a client identity size.42Plan
- CVE-2017-2800A specially crafted x509 certificate can cause a single out of bounds byte overwrite in wolfSSL through 3.10.2 resulting in potential…42Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-5479Apr 10, 2026 · wolfSSL EVP ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD authentication tag30Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-11999Jun 25, 2026 · X.509 trust-chain bypass via path-depth exhaustion in wolfSSL_X509_verify_cert()32Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-6091Jun 25, 2026 · Partial-chain verification accepts untrusted intermediate as trust anchor24Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| alpine:wolfssl | 5.9.2-r0 · Alpine:v3.24 | Package registry (OSV) |
| debian:wolfssl | 5.5.4-2+deb12u3 · Debian:12 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- NVIDIA Project Vanessafinder
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-546676 days apartwc_VerifyEccsiHash missing sanity check30Monitor
- CVE-2026-63290 days apartPKCS#12 MAC verification uses attacker-controlled comparison length24Monitor
- CVE-2026-75110 days apartPKCS7_verify signer confusion allows forged signatures to be accepted23Monitor
- CVE-2026-9441894 days apartSignature failure masked by date error under WOLFSSL_SMALL_CERT_VERIFY9Monitor
- CVE-2026-63310 days apartHMAC zero-length tag forgery in EVP_DigestVerifyFinal8Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
algorithms: ["RS256"],
issuer: "https://id.example.com",
audience: "portal",
});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (1)
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.