NVD / CVE Program· CNA Wordfence

CVE-2026-5364: Drag and Drop File Upload for Contact Form 7 <= 1.1.3 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload via sanitize_file_name Bypass

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)

Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 1% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 64.3% of all records.
Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.

Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

The Drag and Drop File Upload for Contact Form 7 plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file upload in versions up to, and including, 1.1.3. This is due to the plugin extracting the file extension before sanitization occurs and allowing the file type parameter to be controlled by the attacker rather than being restricted to administrator-configured values, which when combined with the fact that validation occurs on the unsanitized extension while the file is saved with a sanitized extension, allows special characters like '$' to be stripped during the save process. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to upload arbitrary PHP files and potentially achieve remote code execution, however, an .htaccess file and name randomization is in place which restricts real-world exploitability.

HighCVSS 8.1 · v3.1—Proof of concept No fix recorded

Published: Apr 24, 2026
Updated: Jun 17, 2026
EPSS: 1.0% · 64th percentile
CWE: CWE-434

Report tools

JSON

Action score

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS: 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
CISA KEV: 0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS: 0 / 30 · 1.0%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical impact: total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD: —
CNA · Wordfence: 8.1; NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Is Drag and Drop File Upload for Contact Form 7 on your site?

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If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Is your version affected? Check it

Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

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Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Wordfence). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

addonsorg Drag and Drop File Upload for Contact Form 7
- up to and including 1.1.3affected · semver

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
Source	Kind	Date
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub	stars:1	2026-05-26

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

PublishedApr 24, 2026
First PoCMay 26, 2026+32 d
TodayOct 26, 2026+185 d

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Thomas Sanzeyfinder

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

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Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).