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CVE-2026-49297· NVD / CVE Program· CNA apache

Apache Airflow Google provider: Path traversal via GCS object names → local/SFTP filesystem (GCSToSFTPOperator + GCSTimeSpanFileTransformOperator)

Apache Airflow's Google provider operators `GCSToSFTPOperator` and `GCSTimeSpanFileTransformOperator` joined GCS object names returned by the bucket listing API directly to a destination filesystem path without normalisation or containment check. A user with write access to the source GCS bucket (typically a different trust principal than the DAG author — partner uploads, ingest-only service accounts, public-data buckets) could create an object whose name contains `..` segments and cause the DAG run to write the downloaded blob outside the configured destination (the SFTP `destination_path` for `GCSToSFTPOperator`; the worker-local temp directory for `GCSTimeSpanFileTransformOperator`), enabling overwrite of arbitrary files on the SFTP server or the worker host. Affects deployments that ingest from buckets writable by less-trusted principals. Users are advised to upgrade to `apache-airflow-providers-google` 22.2.1 or later.

HighCVSS 8.1 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Jul 6, 2026
Updated
Jul 8, 2026
EPSS
1.0% · 61th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

32

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 1.0%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

Affected systems

VendorProduct
apacheapache-airflow-providers-google

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • apache apache-airflow-providers-googlebefore 22.2.1

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • Apache Software Foundation Apache Airflow Google provider

    • before 22.2.1affected · semver

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPIapache-airflow-providers-googlebefore 22.2.122.2.1
PyPIapache-airflow-providers-googlebefore 22.2.122.2.1

Same product

apache: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2023-25691Apache Airflow Google Provider: Google Cloud Sql Provider Remote Command Execution
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2026-45361Apache Airflow Google provider: SSH host key verification disabled in ComputeEngineSSHHook (paramiko AutoAddPolicy default)
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2023-25692Apache Airflow Google Provider: Google Cloud Sql Provider Denial Of Service
    31Monitor
  • CVE-2026-68868Apache Airflow Google provider: google Secret Manager backend: team scope is never applied, exposing every team's Connections and Variables
    26Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
Apache Software Foundation Apache Airflow Google provider22.2.1Vendor (CNA)
PyPI:apache-airflow-providers-google22.2.1Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
none
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
None
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

nvd-secondary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-22 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records