CVE-2026-49097: Apache Camel: Camel-IRC: The irc.sendTo (and other irc.*) Exchange header constants used non-Camel-prefixed names that bypass the HTTP header filter, allowing a
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.67% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 52.2% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.14.8, 4.18.3, 4.21.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel 4.14.8, 4.18.3, 4.21.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Improper Input Validation, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel IRC component. The camel-irc producer chooses the destination of an outgoing IRC message from the irc.sendTo Exchange header (the constant IrcConstants.IRC_SEND_TO, value irc.sendTo); when that header is present it overrides the channel list configured on the endpoint, and the message is sent only to the specified destination. This and the component's other control headers (irc.target, irc.messageType, irc.user.*, irc.num, irc.value) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into an irc: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set the irc.sendTo header and redirect a message that the route intended for a configured channel to an arbitrary IRC channel or user - exfiltrating the message content to an attacker-chosen nickname, leaking it into a public channel, or delivering messages that appear to come from the bot. No credentials are required when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set IRC headers via the raw header names must use the CamelIrc* names (for example CamelIrcSendTo) instead of the old irc.* values. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the irc.* headers from any untrusted ingress before the irc: producer (for example removeHeaders('irc.*') at the start of the route), and set the IRC destination from a trusted source.
- Published
- Jul 6, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 25, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 52th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-20
Report tools
Action score
26
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| apache | camel | cpe:2.3:a:apache:camel |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apache camel4.0.0 and later · before 4.14.8
- apache camel4.15.0 and later · before 4.18.3
- apache camel4.19.0 and later · before 4.21.0
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel
- 4.0.0 and later · before 4.14.8affected · semver
- 4.15.0 and later · before 4.18.3affected · semver
- 4.19.0 and later · before 4.21.0affected · semver
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-irc | from 4.0.0 · before 4.14.8 | 4.14.8 |
| Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-irc | from 4.15.0 · before 4.18.3 | 4.18.3 |
| Maven | org.apache.camel:camel-irc | from 4.19.0 · before 4.21.0 | 4.21.0 |
Same product
apache: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2025-27636Apache Camel: Camel Message Header Injection via Improper Filtering51Plan
- CVE-2026-47323Apache Camel: Camel-CXF Message Header Injection via Missing Inbound Filtering45Plan
- CVE-2026-33453Apache Camel: CoAP URI Query Parameter to Exchange Header Injection in camel-coap Allows Single-Packet Pre-Auth Remote Code Execution43Plan
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-48206Jul 6, 2026 · Apache Camel JIRA: A set of non-Camel-prefixed Exchange header constants bypass the HTTP header filter, allowing an HTTP client to drive arbitrary JIRA issue op21Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-49086Jul 6, 2026 · Apache Camel Dapr: Pub/Sub consumer copied the inbound CloudEvent's pub/sub-name and topic into producer-direction routing headers, allowing an actor who can pu26Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-46587Jul 6, 2026 · Apache Camel: Couchbase: Non-Camel-prefixed Exchange headers bypass HeaderFilterStrategy allowing operation override from untrusted input29Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.14.8 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.18.3 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Camel | 4.21.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Maven:org.apache.camel:camel-irc | 4.14.8 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.camel:camel-irc | 4.18.3 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.camel:camel-irc | 4.21.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-07-20 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+14 d
- TodayNov 4, 2026+121 d
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Yu BaoPaypalfinder
- Andrea CosentinoApache Software Foundationremediation developer
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-464540 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Cometd: Inbound Bayeux message headers are mapped into the Exchange without a HeaderFilterStrategy, allowing unauthenticated clients to inje39Monitor
- CVE-2026-464560 days apartApache Camel: Camel-AWS2-SQS: Inbound message attributes are mapped into the Exchange without an inbound HeaderFilterStrategy, allowing a message sender to inje39Monitor
- CVE-2026-482040 days apartApache Camel: Camel-MongoDB-GridFS: The gridfs.* control headers used non-Camel-prefixed names that bypass the HTTP header filter, allowing an HTTP client to sw39Monitor
- CVE-2026-561400 days apartApache Camel AWS2 SNS: An inbound Camel-namespace filter was added to Sns2HeaderFilterStrategy to align it with sibling components39Monitor
- CVE-2026-7130049 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Atmosphere-Websocket: WebSocket dispatch header injection39Monitor
- CVE-2026-7832949 days apartApache Camel: Camel-Undertow: the endpoint discarded the undertow-specific header filter strategy in favour of the base HTTP one, so the undertow filtering neve39Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-20 · Improper Input ValidationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Buffer Overflow via Environment VariablesCAPEC-10likelihood: High · High
- Server Side Include (SSI) InjectionCAPEC-101likelihood: High · High
- Cross Zone ScriptingCAPEC-104likelihood: Medium · High
- Command Line Execution through SQL InjectionCAPEC-108likelihood: Low · Very High
- Object Relational Mapping InjectionCAPEC-109likelihood: Low · High
- SQL Injection through SOAP Parameter TamperingCAPEC-110likelihood: High · Very High
- Double EncodingCAPEC-120likelihood: Low · Medium
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
ATT&CK techniques
- Obfuscated Files or InformationT1027
- Masquerading: Invalid Code SignatureT1036.001
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Subvert Trust Controls: Code SigningT1553.002
- Impair Defenses:Impair Command History LoggingT1562.003
- Hijack Execution Flow:Dynamic Linker HijackingT1574.006
- Hijack Execution Flow:Path Interception by PATH Environment VariableT1574.007
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.