NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

CVE-2026-48169: PraisonAI has Cross-Workspace IDOR and Privilege Escalation via Platform API

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 35/100)

The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.44% (FIRST EPSS).
Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
Fixed version: praisonai-platform (PyPI) 0.1.4.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to praisonai-platform (PyPI) 0.1.4 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 of the PraisonAI Platform API have two authorization failures that together break workspace isolation. The service layer for issues and projects performs global primary-key lookups without checking workspace ownership, so any authenticated user can read, modify, and delete resources in any workspace just by swapping UUIDs in their API requests. On top of that, every member management endpoint (add, update role, remove) only requires `min_role="member"`, which lets any workspace member promote themselves to owner and kick out the original owner. A low-privilege member of one workspace can steal data from every other workspace and take over any workspace they belong to. Both issues come from the same gap: the route layer pulls `workspace_id` from the URL and verifies membership, but the service layer ignores the workspace scope for resource lookups and ignores the caller's role level for member operations. The `require_workspace_member()` dependency does its job correctly. The problem is that the service layer doesn't use the information it provides. Version 0.1.4 of the PraisonAI Platform API patch the issue.

HighCVSS 8.8 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Broken access control (IDOR)

Published: Aug 7, 2026
Updated: Oct 23, 2026
EPSS: 0.4% · 38th percentile
CWE: CWE-639

Report tools

JSON

Action score

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS: 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
CISA KEV: 0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS: 0 / 30 · 0.4%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation: proof of concept
Automatable: no
Technical impact: total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD: —
CNA · GitHub_M: 8.8; NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Get told when this record changes

Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
No public exploit code on record
A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

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Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

MervinPraison praisonai-platform
- < 0.1.4affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

Ecosystem	Package	Affected range	Fix
PyPI	praisonai-platform	before 0.1.4	0.1.4

Same product

mervinpraison: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

CVE-2026-47410praisonai-platform: JWT signing key defaults to hardcoded "dev-secret-change-me", allowing token forgery for any user when PLATFORM_ENV is unset
39Monitor
CVE-2026-47416praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can promote themselves (or any other member) to owner via PATCH /workspaces/{id}/members/{user_id}
38Monitor
CVE-2026-47413praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can add arbitrary user as owner via POST /workspaces/{id}/members
38Monitor

Published before and after this one in the same product

← EarlierCVE-2026-47418Jul 21, 2026 · praisonai-platform: Project endpoints accept any project_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
32Monitor
← EarlierCVE-2026-47419Jul 21, 2026 · praisonai-platform: Agent endpoints accept any agent_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
33Monitor
Later →CVE-2026-62179Oct 7, 2026 · PraisonAI: Platform members can delete owner issue dependencies through member-owned related issues
26Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / package	Fixed version	Source
PyPI:praisonai-platform	0.1.4	Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

CVE-2026-4741517 days apartpraisonai-platform: Issue endpoints accept any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
33Monitor
CVE-2026-4741917 days apartpraisonai-platform: Agent endpoints accept any agent_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
33Monitor
CVE-2026-4740617 days apartpraisonai-platform: Dependency endpoints accept any issue_id and dep_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace issue linking + read + delete IDOR
32Monitor
CVE-2026-4741717 days apartpraisonai-platform: Comment endpoints accept any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace comment read and post IDOR
32Monitor
CVE-2026-4741817 days apartpraisonai-platform: Project endpoints accept any project_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace read/update/delete IDOR
32Monitor
CVE-2026-4741417 days apartpraisonai-platform: Label endpoints accept any label_id and any issue_id without workspace ownership check, cross-workspace label edit/delete and issue-label-li
30Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

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Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
A low-privileged account is enough.
No user action is required.
No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality: high · data can be read
Integrity: high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability: high · the service can be disrupted

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality impact: High
Integrity impact: High
Availability impact: High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-secondary

Root cause

The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-639 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

1const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);
2res.json(invoice);

Fixed

1const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({
2  id: req.params.id,
3  ownerId: req.user.id,
4});
5if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);
6res.json(invoice);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.

Change log

Fix✗ → ✓Sep 28, 2026, 10:45 PM UTC

For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →

References

github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-gv23-xrm3-8c62

Show all references (1 more)

github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/praisonai-platform/PYSEC-2026-2935.yaml

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records