CVE-2026-46560: OpenAM Authentication Bypass via RADIUS Spoofing
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.18% (FIRST EPSS).
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: OpenIdentityPlatform OpenAM 16.1.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to OpenIdentityPlatform OpenAM 16.1.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Open Access Management (OpenAM) is an access management solution. Prior to 16.1.1, the `RADIUS` authentication module opens an unconnected datagram socket and trusts the first UDP datagram received on the client source port. The receive path does not verify the source IP and port, match the response identifier to the outstanding request, or verify the RFC 2865 `Response Authenticator`; the RFC 2869 `Message-Authenticator` is neither sent nor required. Any non-Reject/non-Challenge packet is treated as success. On a deployment with a `RADIUS` module instance enabled on a login chain, an unauthenticated network attacker can race the real server on-path or spray forged `Access-Accept` packets off-path and obtain a session for any `RADIUS`-mapped username without knowing the shared secret. Unlike CVE-2024-3596, exploitation requires no MD5 chosen-prefix forgery because no response authenticator is checked. The resulting session carries the impersonated principal's privileges. This issue is fixed in version 16.1.1.
- Published
- Oct 30, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 5, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 8th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-347
Report tools
Action score
30
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 7.5
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
OpenIdentityPlatform OpenAM
- < 16.1.1affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-radius | before 16.1.1 | 16.1.1 |
Same product
openidentityplatform: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-123551OpenAM 14.0.0 before 16.1.4 Session Token Disclosure via Notification WebSocket40Plan
- CVE-2026-33439Pre-Authentication Remote Code Execution via `jato.clientSession` Deserialization in OpenAM40Plan
- CVE-2026-62379OpenAM: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution via Class.forName in AuthXMLUtils.createCustomCallback39Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-105122Oct 3, 2026 · OpenAM before 16.1.3 SSRF via OpenID Connect Client jwks_uri21Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-45049Oct 29, 2026 · OpenAM Session Hijacking via CDSSO33Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-123536Nov 8, 2026 · OpenAM before 16.1.4 SSRF via Federation Configuration Wizard Metadata URLs20Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| OpenIdentityPlatform OpenAM | 16.1.1 · description | Vendor (CNA) |
| Maven:org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-radius | 16.1.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 11, 2026+11 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-1235389 days apartOpenAM before 16.1.4 SAML 1.x Signature Verification Issuer Impersonation30Monitor
- CVE-2026-10511827 days apartOpenAM before 16.1.3 Open Redirect via Unverified id_token_hint in endSession9Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
- CVE-2026-1235379 days apartOpenAM before 16.1.4 SSRF via UMA Scope Description URLs21Monitor
- CVE-2026-10512227 days apartOpenAM before 16.1.3 SSRF via OpenID Connect Client jwks_uri21Monitor
- CVE-2026-4420245 days apartOpenAM Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via `/sessionservice`21Monitor
- CVE-2026-1235369 days apartOpenAM before 16.1.4 SSRF via Federation Configuration Wizard Metadata URLs20Monitor
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone on the same network segment can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Adjacent
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
algorithms: ["RS256"],
issuer: "https://id.example.com",
audience: "portal",
});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → none
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.