CVE-2026-39805: CL.CL HTTP request smuggling via duplicate Content-Length in bandit
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 25/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.62% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 50.4% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: mtrudel bandit 1.11.0, f2ca636eb6df385219957e8934e9fc6efa1630d1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to mtrudel bandit 1.11.0, f2ca636eb6df385219957e8934e9fc6efa1630d1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests vulnerability in mtrudel bandit allows HTTP request smuggling via duplicate Content-Length headers. 'Elixir.Bandit.Headers':get_content_length/1 in lib/bandit/headers.ex uses List.keyfind/3, which returns only the first matching header. When a request contains two Content-Length headers with different values, Bandit silently accepts it, uses the first value to read the body, and dispatches the remaining bytes as a second pipelined request on the same keep-alive connection. RFC 9112 §6.3 requires recipients to treat this as an unrecoverable framing error. When Bandit sits behind a proxy that picks the last Content-Length value and forwards the request rather than rejecting it, an unauthenticated attacker can smuggle requests past edge WAF rules, path-based ACLs, rate limiting, and audit logging. This issue affects bandit: before 1.11.0.
- Published
- May 1, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 26, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 50th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-444
Report tools
Action score
25
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 25 / 40 · 6.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 6.3
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
mtrudel bandit
- 0.1.0 and later · before 1.11.0affected · semver
- 7bc8d97cd22697c299baa8012b7f419a7606a80c and later · before f2ca636eb6df385219957e8934e9fc6efa1630d1affected · git
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | bandit | from 0.1.0 · before 1.11.0 | 1.11.0 |
| Hex | bandit | before 1.11.0 | 1.11.0 |
Same product
mtrudel: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-116078HTTP/2 request bodies made of 1-byte DATA frames amplify memory use in Bandit34Monitor
- CVE-2026-115269HTTP/2 WINDOW_UPDATE and SETTINGS frames reset the request body read timeout in Bandit34Monitor
- CVE-2026-114213WebSocket 1-byte continuation frames bypass `max_fragmented_message_size` in Bandit34Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-39804May 1, 2026 · WebSocket permessage-deflate inflate has no output-size cap in bandit32Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-39807May 1, 2026 · Client-supplied URI scheme trusted without transport verification in bandit25Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-42786May 1, 2026 · WebSocket fragmented message reassembly unbounded in bandit34Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| mtrudel bandit | 1.11.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| mtrudel bandit | f2ca636eb6df385219957e8934e9fc6efa1630d1 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Hex:bandit | 1.11.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Peter Ullrichfinder
- Mat Trudelremediation developer
- Jonatan Männchen / EEFanalyst
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-114216178 days apartChunk extensions accept bare LF and CR, enabling request smuggling in Bandit25Monitor
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
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Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-444 · Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling')CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
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Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.