CVE-2026-33671: Picomatch has a ReDoS vulnerability via extglob quantifiers
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 30/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.42% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: azl3 nodejs24 24.14.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 24.14.1-2.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to azl3 nodejs24 24.14.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 24.14.1-2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Picomatch is a glob matcher written JavaScript. Versions prior to 4.0.4, 3.0.2, and 2.3.2 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) when processing crafted extglob patterns. Certain patterns using extglob quantifiers such as `+()` and `*()`, especially when combined with overlapping alternatives or nested extglobs, are compiled into regular expressions that can exhibit catastrophic backtracking on non-matching input. Applications are impacted when they allow untrusted users to supply glob patterns that are passed to `picomatch` for compilation or matching. In those cases, an attacker can cause excessive CPU consumption and block the Node.js event loop, resulting in a denial of service. Applications that only use trusted, developer-controlled glob patterns are much less likely to be exposed in a security-relevant way. This issue is fixed in picomatch 4.0.4, 3.0.2 and 2.3.2. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later, depending on their supported release line. If upgrading is not immediately possible, avoid passing untrusted glob patterns to `picomatch`. Possible mitigations include disabling extglob support for untrusted patterns by using `noextglob: true`, rejecting or sanitizing patterns containing nested extglobs or extglob quantifiers such as `+()` and `*()`, enforcing strict allowlists for accepted pattern syntax, running matching in an isolated worker or separate process with time and resource limits, and applying application-level request throttling and input validation for any endpoint that accepts glob patterns.
- Published
- Mar 26, 2026
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.4% · 36th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-1333
Report tools
Action score
30
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 30 / 40 · 7.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.4%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 7.5
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| jonschlinkert | picomatch | cpe:2.3:a:jonschlinkert:picomatch |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- jonschlinkert picomatchbefore 2.3.2
- jonschlinkert picomatch3.0.0 and later · before 3.0.2
- jonschlinkert picomatch4.0.0 and later · before 4.0.4
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
micromatch picomatch
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.4, >= 3.0.0, < 3.0.2, < 2.3.2affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | node-anymatch | from 0 | — |
| Debian:14 | node-anymatch | before 3.1.3+~cs8.0.6-1 | 3.1.3+~cs8.0.6-1 |
| npm | picomatch | from 3.0.0 · before 3.0.2 | 3.0.2 |
| npm | picomatch | from 4.0.0 · before 4.0.4 | 4.0.4 |
| npm | picomatch | before 2.3.2 | 2.3.2 |
Same product
jonschlinkert: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-33672Picomatch: Method Injection in POSIX Character Classes causes incorrect Glob Matching21Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| azl3 nodejs24 24.14.1-1 on Azure Linux 3.0 | 24.14.1-2 · CBL-Mariner Releases | Microsoft (MSRC) |
| debian:node-anymatch | 3.1.3+~cs8.0.6-1 · Debian:14 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:picomatch | 2.3.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:picomatch | 3.0.2 | Package registry (OSV) |
| npm:picomatch | 4.0.4 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-04-17 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+21 d
- TodayOct 27, 2026+215 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-1333 · Inefficient Regular Expression ComplexityCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.