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CVE-2026-28792· NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

Cross-Origin File Exfiltration via CORS Misconfiguration + Path Traversal in TinaCMS

Tina is a headless content management system. Prior to 2.1.8 , the TinaCMS CLI dev server combines a permissive CORS configuration (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) with the path traversal vulnerability (previously reported) to enable a browser-based drive-by attack. A remote attacker can enumerate the filesystem, write arbitrary files, and delete arbitrary files on developer's machines by simply tricking them into visiting a malicious website while tinacms dev is running. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.8.

CriticalCVSS 9.6 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

Noroxi analysis

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Published
Mar 12, 2026
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
0.6% · 48th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

38

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
38 / 40 · 9.6 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.6%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
9.7
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

VendorProduct
sswtinacms\/cli

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • ssw tinacms/clibefore 2.1.8

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • @tinacms cli

    • < 2.1.8affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npm@tinacms/clibefore 2.1.82.1.8

Same product

ssw: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2026-34603@tinacms/graphql's Media Endpoints Can Escape the Media Root via Symlinks or Junctions
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2026-28793Path Traversal Leading to Arbitrary File Read, Write and Delete in TinaCMS
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2024-45391Tina search token leak via lock file in TinaCMS
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2023-25164Sensitive Information leak via Script File in TinaCMS
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-28791Path Traversal in Media Upload Handle in Tina
    29Monitor
  • CVE-2026-29066Arbitrary File Read via Disabled Vite Filesystem Restriction in TinaCMS CLI
    24Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
@tinacms cli2.1.8 · descriptionVendor (CNA)
npm:@tinacms/cli2.1.8Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-287930 days apartPath Traversal Leading to Arbitrary File Read, Write and Delete in TinaCMS
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2026-3460320 days apart@tinacms/graphql's Media Endpoints Can Escape the Media Root via Symlinks or Junctions
    33Monitor
  • CVE-2026-287910 days apartPath Traversal in Media Upload Handle in Tina
    29Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • A user must open a link or visit a page.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
Required
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-secondary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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