NVD / CVE Program· CNA CPANSec

CVE-2026-18092: Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 32/100)

The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.33% (FIRST EPSS).
Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
No fixed version is recorded, but the references include a patch (commit or PR) link.

Low priority for now. See the fix and affected versions sections below.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass via XML signature wrapping because new_from_xml reads assertion identity with document-wide XPath instead of the signed subtree. new_from_xml reads the NameID, attribute values, SessionIndex, audience and other identity fields with document-wide XPath, such as //saml:Assertion/saml:AttributeStatement/saml:Attribute and //saml:Subject/saml:NameID, which select the first matching element in document order rather than the element covered by the verified signature. handle_response confirms that a signature is present and, when a cacert is configured, that it chains to the CA, but XML::Sig verifies only the element named by the signature's Reference URI, so unsigned sibling assertions in the same document are not covered. An attacker who holds any one IdP-signed assertion can add an unsigned attacker-authored assertion earlier in document order; the signature still verifies and the document-order XPath returns the attacker's NameID and attributes. Any caller that passes an untrusted Response to new_from_xml can accept identity fields from an assertion the IdP never signed, even when a cacert trust anchor is configured, so a party holding one valid IdP-signed assertion can authenticate as an arbitrary user.

HighCVSS 8.1 · v3.1—No exploit No fix recorded

Published: Aug 3, 2026
Updated: Oct 23, 2026
EPSS: 0.3% · 27th percentile
CWE: CWE-347

Report tools

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Action score

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS: 32 / 40 · 8.1 / 10
CISA KEV: 0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS: 0 / 30 · 0.3%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical impact: partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

Get told when this record changes

Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
No public exploit code on record
No fixed version yet

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

Vendor	Product	CPE
timlegge	net::saml2	cpe:2.3:a:timlegge:net::saml2

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

timlegge net::saml2before 0.86

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (CPANSec). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

TIMLEGGE Net::SAML2
- before 0.86affected

Same product

timlegge: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

CVE-2026-18108Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content c
39Monitor
CVE-2026-18089Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no
30Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2commit 201fead

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

CVE-2026-181080 days apartNet::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow authentication bypass because _verify_encrypted_assertion accepts an EncryptedAssertion whose decrypted content c
39Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
No account or password is required.
A user must open a link or visit a page.
No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality: none
Integrity: high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability: high · the service can be disrupted

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: None
User interaction: Required
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality impact: None
Integrity impact: High
Availability impact: High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

nvd-secondary

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-347 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

1const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

Fixed

1const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
2  algorithms: ["RS256"],
3  issuer: "https://id.example.com",
4  audience: "portal",
5});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

ATT&CK techniques

—

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

github.com/perl-net-saml2/perl-Net-SAML2/commit/201fead7f42b83f40c84bf4a311a25b09acd18f9.patch

Show all references (1 more)

metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.86/changes

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records