CVE-2026-15689: Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_res
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 39/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.60% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: perl-Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible (openSUSE:Leap 16.0) 0.714.0-bp160.1.1; perl-Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible (openSUSE:Tumbleweed) 0.713.0-1.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to perl-Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible (openSUSE:Leap 16.0) 0.714.0-bp160.1.1; perl-Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible (openSUSE:Tumbleweed) 0.713.0-1.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible versions through 0.713 for Perl allow password reset link poisoning via the request Host header in _default_email_password_reset and _default_welcome_send. Both default emails emit a link of the form `$base/login/$code`, whose authority comes from the request Host header, or from X-Forwarded-Host under behind_proxy (obtained from Dancer2's request->base function). A POST to /login carrying submit_reset and a username needs no authentication: it stores a fresh reset code against that account and mails the account holder a link to a host of the sender's choosing. The welcome mail takes the same path when the application calls create_user with email_welcome set. Through 0.711 the handlers read `request->uri_base` and `request->base` directly; Versions 0.712 and later provide an uri_base configuration key that defaults to the untrusted `request->uri_base` when unset. The default configuration with reset_password_handler enabled and the default message text, a recipient who follows the link hands a working reset code to the sender's host, which is enough to take over the account.
- Published
- Aug 15, 2026
- Updated
- Aug 26, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 48th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-640
Report tools
Action score
39
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (CPANSec). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
ABEVERLEY Dancer2::Plugin::Auth::Extensible
- up to and including 0.713affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| openSUSE:Leap 16.0 | perl-Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible | before 0.714.0-bp160.1.1 | 0.714.0-bp160.1.1 |
| openSUSE:Tumbleweed | perl-Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible | before 0.713.0-1.1 | 0.713.0-1.1 |
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| opensuse:perl-Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible | 0.713.0-1.1 · openSUSE:Tumbleweed | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-640 · Weak Password Recovery Mechanism for Forgotten PasswordCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
- metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.711/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L1097-1121
- metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.712/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L178-194
- metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.713/changes
- metacpan.org/release/ABEVERLEY/Dancer2-Plugin-Auth-Extensible-0.713/source/lib/Dancer2/Plugin/Auth/Extensible.pm#L178-196
- www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/15/4
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.