CVE-2026-127121: SOGo before 5.12.13 S/MIME Certificate Spoofing via UIxMailView
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 28/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: Alinto sogo 5.12.13.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to Alinto sogo 5.12.13 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
SOGo before 5.12.13 contains an improper cryptographic signature verification vulnerability that allows remote attackers to replace a victim's contact S/MIME certificate by sending a spoofed multipart/signed message with a mismatched signature and an impersonated From address. Attackers can deliver a crafted CMS signedData object containing their own self-signed certificate, which SOGo's UIxMailView stores on the contact card without validating signature authenticity or certificate identity, enabling subsequent encrypted communications to be decrypted with the attacker's private key.
- Published
- Nov 12, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 12, 2026
- EPSS
- —
- CWE
- CWE-347
Report tools
Action score
28
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 28 / 40 · 7.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · —
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · VulnCheck
- 7.1
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (VulnCheck). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Alinto sogo
- before 5.12.13affected · semver
Same product
alinto: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-127131SOGo before 5.12.13 Missing Rate Limiting on TOTP Verification36Monitor
- CVE-2026-127111SOGo before 5.12.13 Unauthenticated Password Recovery Brute Force36Monitor
- CVE-2026-93453SOGo before 5.12.11 Password Reset Token Interception via Origin Header34Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-46445May 14, 2026 · SOGo before 5.12.7, when PostgreSQL is used, allows SQL injection.28Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-46446May 14, 2026 · SOGo before 5.12.7, when PostgreSQL or MariaDB is used, and cleartext passwords are stored, allows SQL injection.28Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-127135Nov 12, 2026 · SOGo before 5.12.13 Sieve Script Injection via Notification Address21Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Alinto sogo | 5.12.13 | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 12, 2026same day
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Richard Olszynskýfinder
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- P
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
algorithms: ["RS256"],
issuer: "https://id.example.com",
audience: "portal",
});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → none
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.