CVE-2026-124079: rConfig Core 8.0.0 before 8.2.19 and rConfig Pro before 8.4.1 RCE via Unauthenticated Redis Queue Poisoning
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 37/100)
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.62% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 50.2% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: rConfig rConfig Core 8.2.19; rConfig rConfig Pro 8.4.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to rConfig rConfig Core 8.2.19; rConfig rConfig Pro 8.4.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
rConfig Core 8.0.0 before 8.2.19 and rConfig Pro before 8.4.1 contain a deserialization of untrusted data vulnerability that allows unauthenticated network attackers to execute arbitrary code by pushing a crafted serialized job onto the Redis-backed Laravel Horizon queue, which runs without authentication in affected deployments. Laravel's CallQueuedHandler unserializes the job without class restrictions, allowing attackers to instantiate the existing App\\Jobs\\TaskDownloadRun class and invoke an attacker-controlled Artisan command. Attackers can leverage the bundled laravel/tinker package to execute arbitrary PHP and operating system commands as the queue worker's user, write a persistent web shell into the web-served storage/app/public directory, and read database credentials, stored device credentials, and API tokens. Where Redis is not directly reachable, authenticated attackers can deliver the payload through the application by configuring a device target that points at the rConfig server's loopback address.
- Published
- Nov 9, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 12, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.6% · 50th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-502
Report tools
Action score
37
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 37 / 40 · 9.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.6%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · VulnCheck
- 9.3
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
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Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (VulnCheck). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
rConfig rConfig Core
- 8.0.0 and later · before 8.2.19affected · semver
rConfig rConfig Pro
- before 8.4.1affected · semver
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| rConfig rConfig Core | 8.2.19 | Vendor (CNA) |
| rConfig rConfig Pro | 8.4.1 | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2026-11-11 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- First PoC+1 d
- TodayNov 13, 2026+3 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
Not on record for this CVE: patch commit or PR link · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-502 · Deserialization of Untrusted DataCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Root cause
Data received over the network is deserialized into the language’s native object format without verifying its source. Code paths inside the object can be triggered during deserialization.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-502 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
payload = sock.recv(65536)
job = pickle.loads(payload)Fixed
payload = sock.recv(65536)
if not hmac.compare_digest(sign(payload), header_sig):
raise PermissionError("invalid signature")
job = JobSchema.validate(json.loads(payload))Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Exploit maturitynone → poc
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.