CVE-2026-119446: Session fixation in the CLI login flow allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain a user's API token
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 37/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.46% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: nerves-hub nerves_hub_web 2.5.3, 3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to nerves-hub nerves_hub_web 2.5.3, 3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Session Fixation vulnerability in the CLI login flow in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated attacker to obtain an API token for another user's account via a crafted login link. Starting a CLI login with POST /api/auth/cli_session needs no authentication and returns a polling token, a confirmation URL that carries that token, and a confirmation code. When a signed-in user opens that URL and clicks Confirm, NervesHub.Accounts.verify_cli_session_token/2 creates an API token for the user's account and stores it on the login, and the next poll of GET /api/auth/cli_session/<token> returns it to whoever started the login. The confirmation code is only displayed and is never compared with anything, so it cannot show that the person confirming is the one who started the login. The confirm form carries a CSRF token and the page cannot be framed, so the attacker has to persuade the user to open the link and click the button themselves. This issue affects nerves_hub: from 2.5.0 before 2.5.3.
- Published
- Nov 10, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 10, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.4% · 40th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-384
Report tools
Action score
37
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 37 / 40 · 9.4 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.4%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 9.4
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
nerves-hub nerves_hub_web
- 2.5.0 and later · before 2.5.3affected · other
- 2.5.0 and later · before 2.5.3affected · semver
- e6bf11a812d7aa8b69d854ba8ef02d65516f5564 and later · before 3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508affected · git
Same product
nerves-hub: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-120730Mass assignment of organization, product and deployment group IDs allows users to write into other organizations and receive their firmware34Monitor
- CVE-2026-120999Improper authentication lets Google sign-in and confirmation links sign users in to accounts registered with their email address by someone else29Monitor
- CVE-2026-120295Incorrect authorization in the devices page bulk move allows view-role members to move devices into another organization and receive its firmware28Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →CVE-2026-120286Nov 10, 2026 · Missing authorization in device and deployment group page events allows view-role members to change devices and deployment groups21Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-120997Nov 10, 2026 · Improper session invalidation keeps removed or demoted members' open pages and device consoles working at their old role9Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| nerves-hub nerves_hub_web | 2.5.3 | Vendor (CNA) |
| nerves-hub nerves_hub_web | 3131f1701194b581ab4b3e5e9d81194fc9c83508 | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 12, 2026+2 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Amr Kadryfinder
- Josh Kalderimisremediation developer
- Jonatan Männchen / EEFcoordinator
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- A
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-384 · Session FixationCVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Session Credential Falsification through ForgingCAPEC-196likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Exploitation of Trusted IdentifiersCAPEC-21likelihood: High · High
- Accessing/Intercepting/Modifying HTTP CookiesCAPEC-31likelihood: High · High
- Manipulating Opaque Client-based Data TokensCAPEC-39likelihood: High · Medium
- Session Credential Falsification through PredictionCAPEC-59likelihood: High · High
- Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)CAPEC-60likelihood: High · High
- Session FixationCAPEC-61likelihood: Medium · High
ATT&CK techniques
- Access Token ManipulationT1134
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with TokenT1134.002
- Access Token Manipulation: Make and Impersonate TokenT1134.003
- Steal Application Access TokenT1528
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Forge Web CredentialsT1606
Change log
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (4 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.