CVE-2026-117549: @fastify/secure-session vulnerable to signature verification bypass via cookie signature removal
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 16/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.07% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: @fastify/secure-session @fastify/secure-session 8.4.2.
- Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).
Low priority for now. Upgrade to @fastify/secure-session @fastify/secure-session 8.4.2 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
@fastify/secure-session is a session plugin for Fastify that stores an encrypted session in a cookie. In versions 7.5.0 through 8.4.1, when the plugin is configured with the signed cookie option, it calls the cookie unsign routine but, when the signature check reports the value as invalid, still passes the original cookie value to the session decoder, so a session whose signature did not validate is decrypted anyway. The practical effect appears when an application supplies the cookie signing secret independently of the session encryption key and rotates only the signing secret to retire existing sessions while keeping the encryption key active, because a holder of an old session cookie can strip the now obsolete signature and keep using the session. The attacker must already possess an unexpired encrypted session cookie and needs neither secret, and cannot forge session data, extend expiry, or survive rotation of the encryption key. The issue is fixed in @fastify/secure-session 8.4.2, which no longer decodes the session when the signed cookie option is set and the signature check fails, and users should upgrade to 8.4.2 or later. As a workaround, rotate the session encryption key rather than relying on rotation of the cookie signing secret alone.
- Published
- Nov 2, 2026
- Updated
- Nov 2, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.0% · 0th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-347
Report tools
Action score
16
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 16 / 40 · 4.2 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.0%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · openjs
- 4.2
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (openjs). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
@fastify/secure-session @fastify/secure-session
- 8.4.2not affected
- 7.5.0 and later · before 8.4.2affected · semver
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| @fastify/secure-session @fastify/secure-session | 8.4.2 | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 13, 2026+11 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- nirodhavreporter
- mcollinaremediation developer
- UlisesGasconremediation developer
National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)
Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.
- TR-26-1447 · Nov 3, 2026(Fastify Güvenlik Zafiyeti)
Not on record for this CVE: patch commit or PR link · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
nvd-secondary
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
algorithms: ["RS256"],
issuer: "https://id.example.com",
audience: "portal",
});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → none
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.