CVE-2026-114618: Authlib: Default JWT bearer grant accepts assertions for the wrong audience
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 27/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.35% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: authlib authlib 1.9.0.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to authlib authlib 1.9.0 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Authlib is a Python library which builds OAuth and OpenID Connect servers. Prior to 1.9.0, the default RFC 7523 JWTBearerGrant.get_audiences() returns an empty list, causing JWTBearerGrant.verify_claims() to require only that an aud claim exists without matching the current authorization server. An attacker holding a legitimate assertion for another service can present it to a server that shares the signing key and uses the default grant, obtaining an access token across a trust boundary. Implementations that override get_audiences() with the server's valid audience identifiers are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 1.9.0.
- Published
- Oct 22, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 29, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 29th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-287
Report tools
Action score
27
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 27 / 40 · 6.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- proof of concept
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 6.8
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| authlib | authlib | cpe:2.3:a:authlib:authlib |
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
authlib authlib
- < 1.9.0affected
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- authlib authlibbefore 1.9.0
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | python-authlib | from 0 | — |
| Debian:14 | python-authlib | before 1.9.1-1 | 1.9.1-1 |
| openSUSE:Tumbleweed | python-Authlib | before 1.9.1-1.1 | 1.9.1-1.1 |
| PyPI | authlib | before 1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
Same product
authlib: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-104056Authlib version 1.7.2 and below contains a vulnerability where discovery JSON metadata is cached without validation or issuer-origin…39Monitor
- CVE-2026-96760Authlib library contains a signature‑verification bypass vulnerability39Monitor
- CVE-2026-114616Authlib accepts an empty HMAC key, allowing JWS/JWT signature forgery (HS256/HS384/HS512)36Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-114615Oct 22, 2026 · Authlib incomplete algorithm-confusion fix permits HMAC forgery with prefixed public keys36Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-114617Oct 22, 2026 · Authlib: ID token can disable its own nonce validation via the nonce_supported claim16Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-114619Oct 22, 2026 · Authlib: OpenID implicit grant checks raw scope instead of allowed scope before issuing ID tokens18Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| authlib authlib | 1.9.0 · description | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:python-authlib | 1.9.1-1 · Debian:14 | Package registry (OSV) |
| opensuse:python-Authlib | 1.9.1-1.1 · openSUSE:Tumbleweed | Package registry (OSV) |
| PyPI:authlib | 1.9.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 13, 2026+22 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
- CVE-2026-1146160 days apartAuthlib accepts an empty HMAC key, allowing JWS/JWT signature forgery (HS256/HS384/HS512)36Monitor
Not on record for this CVE: researcher credit · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-287 · Improper AuthenticationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
nvd-secondary
Root cause
Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-287 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middleware
app.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);Fixed
const admin = express.Router();
admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);
app.use("/admin", admin);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Authentication AbuseCAPEC-114Medium
- Authentication BypassCAPEC-115Medium
- Identity SpoofingCAPEC-151likelihood: Medium · Medium
- Fake the Source of DataCAPEC-194Medium
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Utilizing REST's Trust in the System Resource to Obtain Sensitive DataCAPEC-57likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Session HijackingCAPEC-593likelihood: High · Very High
- Token ImpersonationCAPEC-633Medium
ATT&CK techniques
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → poc
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.