CVE-2026-112880: CRLF injection in Proxy-Authorization header built from proxy_auth_fun in hackney
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 8/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.18% (FIRST EPSS).
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- Fixed version: benoitc hackney 4.9.0, 5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to benoitc hackney 4.9.0, 5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting') vulnerability in hackney_http_connect in benoitc hackney allows HTTP Request Splitting via the value a proxy_auth_fun callback returns. After a 407 response from an HTTP CONNECT proxy, hackney_http_connect:handle_proxy_auth/11 calls the caller's proxy_auth_fun with the status code and the response headers and writes the returned binary into the Proxy-Authorization line of the CONNECT retry without checking it. A CR, LF or NUL byte in that value adds header lines to the request sent to the proxy. The value is attacker-influenced when the callback derives it from untrusted data, for example from the proxy's challenge headers. Other caller-supplied values on the CONNECT path, such as the target host and the request headers, were already checked for control bytes. This issue affects hackney: from 2.0.0 before 4.9.0.
- Published
- Oct 26, 2026
- Updated
- Oct 26, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.1% · 8th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-113
Report tools
Action score
8
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 8 / 40 · 2.1 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.1%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · EEF
- 2.1
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (EEF). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
benoitc hackney
- 2.0.0 and later · before 4.9.0affected · semver
- 5df5a74a2817d5b12880d217db33253ff1fae1b5 and later · before 5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9affected · git
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hex | hackney | from 2.0.0 · before 4.9.0 | 4.9.0 |
Same product
benoitc: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2026-115693Custom cacerts or cacertfile do not restrict trust to the pinned CA in hackney36Monitor
- CVE-2026-47073Unbounded memory consumption in WebSocket client in hackney34Monitor
- CVE-2026-47067Atom table exhaustion via unrecognized URL schemes in hackney34Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-47076May 25, 2026 · SSRF allowlist bypass via percent-encoded host in hackney27Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2026-47077May 25, 2026 · Unbounded body accumulation in HTTP/3 response loop in hackney32Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-113440Oct 26, 2026 · HTTP/1.1 and HTTP/2 redirects resend basic_auth and cookie to a different scheme or port in hackney24Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| benoitc hackney | 4.9.0 | Vendor (CNA) |
| benoitc hackney | 5ee7d7d19eba27e774667d472feb1e93a08af7f9 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Hex:hackney | 4.9.0 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- Fix recordedsame day
- TodayNov 13, 2026+18 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Daniel Colesfinder
- Benoit Chesneauremediation developer
- Jonatan Männchen / EEFcoordinator
Not on record for this CVE: variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Someone with local access to the system can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- Integrity
- Availability
- Attack vector
- Local
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- X
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-113 · Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in HTTP Headers ('HTTP Request/Response Splitting')CVSS vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
Change log
- SSVC exploitation— → none
- Exploit maturity— → none
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (5 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.