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CVE-2026-101044· NVD / CVE Program· CNA VulnCheck

pacquet before 12.0.0-alpha.5 Path Traversal via lockfile alias

pacquet, the Rust package-manager component shipped in the pnpm npm package versions >=12.0.0-alpha.0 and <12.0.0-alpha.5, does not validate dependency alias/name paths taken from a lockfile before using them in install-time filesystem joins. When a user installs a project with an attacker-supplied lockfile using --trust-lockfile or a frozen lockfile, alias entries containing path traversal segments (for example '../../escaped-link') are used when creating dependency and package links, bin destinations, hoisted entries, and virtual-store slots, allowing symlinks and directories to be created outside the intended project and node_modules boundary. Version 12.0.0-alpha.5 validates dependency names and every virtual-store slot path with a shared safe-join containment helper before any filesystem materialization, rejecting traversal, absolute, platform-specific, and reserved names with ERR_PNPM_INVALID_DEPENDENCY_NAME.

HighCVSS 7.1 · v4.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Sep 27, 2026
Updated
Sep 27, 2026
EPSS
0.3% · 16th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

28

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
28 / 40 · 7.1 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.3%

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · VulnCheck
7.1
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (VulnCheck). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • pnpm pnpm

    • 12.0.0-alpha.5not affected
    • 12.0.0-alpha.0 and later · before 12.0.0-alpha.5affected · semver

Same product

pnpm: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2025-69264pnpm v10+ Bypass "Dependency lifecycle scripts execution disabled by default"
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2023-37478pnpm incorrectly parses tar archives relative to specification
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2026-55698pnpm: Project env lockfile can short-circuit package-manager resolution and execute lockfile-selected pnpm bytes
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2026-55697pnpm: Repository-controlled configDependencies can select a pacquet native install engine
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2026-55487pnpm: manifest identity spoof satisfies allowBuilds and runs attacker lifecycle
    35Monitor
  • CVE-2026-50016pnpm: Transitive dependency alias path traversal allows project path override via symlink replacement
    35Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
pnpm pnpm12.0.0-alpha.5Vendor (CNA)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2026-5919583 days apartpnpm: Path traversal in configDependencies env lockfile allows symlink creation outside node_modules/.pnpm-config
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2026-8239327 days apartpnpm: A tarball dependency's manifest `name` escapes node_modules → arbitrary file write/overwrite on install
    30Monitor
  • CVE-2026-5001594 days apartpnpm: Arbitrary File Write/Delete via Malicious Patch File (Path Traversal)
    29Monitor
  • CVE-2026-8239227 days apartpnpm: Virtual store linker path traversal via unvalidated depPath name in lockfileToDepGraph
    28Monitor
  • CVE-2026-5919483 days apartpnpm: patch-remove could delete project-selected files outside the patches directory
    28Monitor
  • CVE-2026-5919683 days apartpnpm: hoisted install imports lockfile alias outside node_modules
    28Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
P
Scope
X

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

nvd-secondary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-22 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records