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CVE-2025-9485· NVD / CVE Program· CNA Wordfence

OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client) <= 6.26.12 - Authentication Bypass via get_resource_owner_from_id_token()

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 39/100)

  • Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
  • Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.59% (FIRST EPSS).
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
  • No fixed version is recorded, but the references include a patch (commit or PR) link.
  • Mentioned 1 time in Turkish national cyber security advisories (siberguvenlik.gov.tr).

Low priority for now. See the fix and affected versions sections below.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

The OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature in versions up to, and including, 6.26.12. This is due to the plugin performing unsafe JWT token processing without verification or validation in the `get_resource_owner_from_id_token` function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication and gain access to any existing user account - including administrators in certain configurations - or to create arbitrary subscriber-level accounts.

CriticalCVSS 9.8 · v3.1—Proof of concept No fix recorded
Published
Oct 4, 2025
Updated
Oct 11, 2026
EPSS
0.5% · 47th percentile

Report tools

JSON

Action score

39

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.5%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · Wordfence
9.8
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

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When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

—

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (Wordfence). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • cyberlord92 OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client)

    • up to and including 6.26.12affected · semver

Same product

cyberlord92: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2024-10111OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client) <= 6.26.3 - Authentication Bypass
    32Monitor
  • CVE-2025-10753OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client) <= 6.26.14 - Missing Authorization
    21Monitor
  • CVE-2025-10752OAuth Single Sign On – SSO (OAuth Client) <= 6.26.12 - Cross-Site Request Forgery
    17Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02026-03-23

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. First PoC+170 d
  3. TodayOct 17, 2026+378 d
EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

National notice (Türkiye Cybersecurity Directorate / USOM)

Official security notices citing this record; remediation advice is on the agency's page.

All national notices →

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-secondary

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-347 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

Fixed

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {  algorithms: ["RS256"],  issuer: "https://id.example.com",  audience: "portal",});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

ATT&CK techniques

—

Change log

No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.

References

Show all references (2 more)

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records