Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allow a physi
Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allow a physically proximate attacker to escalate privileges by booting from a USB device with a valid root filesystem. This occurs because of insecure default settings in the Legacy GRUB Bootloader.
- Published
- Dec 2, 2025
- Updated
- Aug 26, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 24th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-290
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Report tools
Action score
27
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 27 / 40 · 6.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| entrust | nshield 5c firmware | cpe:2.3:o:entrust:nshield_5c_firmware |
| entrust | nshield 5c | cpe:2.3:h:entrust:nshield_5c |
| entrust | nshield hsmi firmware | cpe:2.3:o:entrust:nshield_hsmi_firmware |
| entrust | nshield hsmi | cpe:2.3:h:entrust:nshield_hsmi |
| entrust | nshield connect xc base firmware | cpe:2.3:o:entrust:nshield_connect_xc_base_firmware |
| entrust | nshield connect xc base | cpe:2.3:h:entrust:nshield_connect_xc_base |
| entrust | nshield connect xc mid firmware | cpe:2.3:o:entrust:nshield_connect_xc_mid_firmware |
| entrust | nshield connect xc mid | cpe:2.3:h:entrust:nshield_connect_xc_mid |
| entrust | nshield connect xc high firmware | cpe:2.3:o:entrust:nshield_connect_xc_high_firmware |
| entrust | nshield connect xc high | cpe:2.3:h:entrust:nshield_connect_xc_high |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- entrust nshield 5c firmwarebefore 13.6.12
- entrust nshield 5c firmware13.7 and later · before 13.9.0
- entrust nshield connect xc base firmware13.7 and later · before 13.9.0
- entrust nshield connect xc base firmwarebefore 13.6.12
- entrust nshield connect xc high firmware13.7 and later · before 13.9.0
- entrust nshield connect xc high firmwarebefore 13.6.12
- entrust nshield connect xc mid firmwarebefore 13.6.12
- entrust nshield connect xc mid firmware13.7 and later · before 13.9.0
- entrust nshield hsmi firmwarebefore 13.6.12
- entrust nshield hsmi firmware13.7 and later · before 13.9.0
Same product
entrust: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2025-59695Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allow a user 39Monitor
- CVE-2025-59693The Chassis Management Board in Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) 39Monitor
- CVE-2025-59703Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allow a Physi36Monitor
- CVE-2025-59702Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allow a physi28Monitor
- CVE-2025-59697Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allow a physi28Monitor
- CVE-2025-59705Entrust nShield Connect XC, nShield 5c, and nShield HSMi through 13.6.11, or 13.7 (patched in 13.6.12 (LTS) and 13.9.0 (STS)), allow a Physi27Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| n/a n/a | 13.6.12 · description | Vendor (CNA) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Physical access to the device is required.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Physical
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-290 · Authentication Bypass by SpoofingCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- Exploitation of Trusted IdentifiersCAPEC-21likelihood: High · High
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- Creating a Rogue Certification Authority CertificateCAPEC-459likelihood: Medium · Very High
- Web Services API Signature Forgery Leveraging Hash Function Extension WeaknessCAPEC-461High
- Signature SpoofCAPEC-473
- Signature Spoofing by MisrepresentationCAPEC-476likelihood: Low · High
- Session Credential Falsification through PredictionCAPEC-59likelihood: High · High
- Reusing Session IDs (aka Session Replay)CAPEC-60likelihood: High · High
ATT&CK techniques
- Masquerading: Invalid Code SignatureT1036.001
- Access Token ManipulationT1134
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
- Steal Application Access TokenT1528
- Steal Web Session CookieT1539
- Use Alternate Authentication Material:Web Session CookieT1550.004
- Subvert Trust Controls: Code SigningT1553.002
- Adversary-in-the-MiddleT1557
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-g9v7-h8x8-w5vw
- www.entrust.com/knowledgebase/hardware/understanding-nshield-security-advisory-september-2025
- www.entrust.com/use-case/why-use-an-hsm
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.