Howyar UEFI Application "Reloader" (32-bit and 64-bit) is vulnerable to execution of unsigned software in a hardcoded path.

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

• cs-grp neo impactbefore 10.1.024-20241127
• greenware greenguardbefore 10.2.023-20240927
• howyar sysreturnbefore 10.2.023_20240919
• radix smart recoverybefore 11.2.023-20240927
• sanfong ez-back systembefore 10.3.024-20241127
• signalcomputer hdd kingbefore 10.3.021-20241127
• wasay erecoveryrxbefore 8.4.022-20241127

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (certcc). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

• CES Taiwan CES NeoImpact

  • before 10.1.024-20241127affected

• Greenware Technologies GreenGuard

  • before 10.2.023-20240927affected

• Howyar Technologies SysReturn (32-bit and 64-bit)

  • before 10.2.02320240919affected

• Radix SmartRecovery

  • before 11.2.023-20240927affected

• SANFONG SANFONG EZ-Back System

  • before 10.3.024-20241127affected

• SignalComputer HDD King

  • before 10.3.021-20241127affected

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

1const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

1const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {2  algorithms: ["RS256"],3  issuer: "https://id.example.com",4  audience: "portal",5});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.