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CVE-2024-3571· NVD / CVE Program· CNA @huntr_ai

Path Traversal in langchain-ai/langchain

langchain-ai/langchain is vulnerable to path traversal due to improper limitation of a pathname to a restricted directory ('Path Traversal') in its LocalFileStore functionality. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to read or write files anywhere on the filesystem, potentially leading to information disclosure or remote code execution. The issue lies in the handling of file paths in the mset and mget methods, where user-supplied input is not adequately sanitized, allowing directory traversal sequences to reach unintended directories.

HighCVSS 8.8 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available
Published
Apr 15, 2024
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
1.9% · 79th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

36

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
1 / 30 · 1.9%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
no
Technical impact
partial

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
8.8
CNA · @huntr_ai
6.5
2.3 point gap

CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for the hundreds of thousands of vulnerabilities in the database; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

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Affected systems

VendorProduct
langchainlangchain

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

  • langchain langchain0.0.351

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (@huntr_ai). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • langchain-ai langchain-ai/langchain

    • unspecified and later · before 0.0.353affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
PyPIlangchainbefore 0.0.3530.0.353

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2023-29374In LangChain through 0.0.131, the LLMMathChain chain allows prompt injection attacks that can execute arbitrary code via the Python exec met
    51Plan
  • CVE-2023-46229LangChain before 0.0.317 allows SSRF via document_loaders/recursive_url_loader.py because crawling can proceed from an external server to an
    48Plan
  • CVE-2025-2828SSRF Vulnerability in RequestsToolkit in langchain-ai/langchain
    46Plan
  • CVE-2024-8309SQL Injection in langchain-ai/langchain
    43Plan
  • CVE-2023-36281An issue in langchain v.0.0.171 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via a JSON file to load_prompt.
    40Plan
  • CVE-2023-38896An issue in Harrison Chase langchain v.0.0.194 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the from_math_prompt and fr
    40Plan

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
PyPI:langchain0.0.353Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2024-2808843 days apartLangChain through 0.1.10 allows ../ directory traversal by an actor who is able to control the final part of the path parameter in a load_ch
    33Monitor

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
high · the service can be disrupted
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
High

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

A user-supplied file name is joined with the allowed directory, but the result is never checked to confirm it is still inside that directory.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const file = path.join(ROOT, req.query.name);res.sendFile(file);

Fixed

ts
const file = path.resolve(ROOT, req.query.name);if (!file.startsWith(ROOT + path.sep)) {  return res.sendStatus(400);}res.sendFile(file);

Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records