CVE-2024-35238: Denial of service of Minder Server from maliciously crafted GitHub attestations
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.53% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- Fixed version: github.com/stacklok/minder (Go) 0.0.51.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to github.com/stacklok/minder (Go) 0.0.51 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Minder by Stacklok is an open source software supply chain security platform. Minder prior to version 0.0.51 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service (DoS) attack which could allow an attacker to crash the Minder server and deny other users access to it. The root cause of the vulnerability is that Minders sigstore verifier reads an untrusted response entirely into memory without enforcing a limit on the response body. An attacker can exploit this by making Minder make a request to an attacker-controlled endpoint which returns a response with a large body which will crash the Minder server. Specifically, the point of failure is where Minder parses the response from the GitHub attestations endpoint in `getAttestationReply`. Here, Minder makes a request to the `orgs/$owner/attestations/$checksumref` GitHub endpoint (line 285) and then parses the response into the `AttestationReply` (line 295). The way Minder parses the response on line 295 makes it prone to DoS if the response is large enough. Essentially, the response needs to be larger than the machine has available memory. Version 0.0.51 contains a patch for this issue. The content that is hosted at the `orgs/$owner/attestations/$checksumref` GitHub attestation endpoint is controlled by users including unauthenticated users to Minders threat model. However, a user will need to configure their own Minder settings to cause Minder to make Minder send a request to fetch the attestations. The user would need to know of a package whose attestations were configured in such a way that they would return a large response when fetching them. As such, the steps needed to carry out this attack would look as such: 1. The attacker adds a package to ghcr.io with attestations that can be fetched via the `orgs/$owner/attestations/$checksumref` GitHub endpoint. 2. The attacker registers on Minder and makes Minder fetch the attestations. 3. Minder fetches attestations and crashes thereby being denied of service.
- Published
- May 27, 2024
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.5% · 44th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-770
Report tools
Action score
21
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.5%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- —
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 5.3
- NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Running WordPress? Scan your site free with WP Lens
Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
—
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
stacklok minder
- < 0.0.51affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/stacklok/minder | before 0.0.51 | 0.0.51 |
Same product
stacklok: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2024-34084Minder's Github Webhook Handler vulnerable to denial of service from un-validated requests30Monitor
- CVE-2024-37904Denial of service from maliciously configured Git repository in Minder22Monitor
- CVE-2024-35194Stacklok Minder vulnerable to denial of service from maliciously crafted templates21Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2024-31455Apr 9, 2024 · Minder GetRepositoryByName data leak17Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2024-35185May 16, 2024 · Denial of service of Minder Server with attacker-controlled REST endpoint21Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Go:github.com/stacklok/minder | 0.0.51 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-770 · Allocation of Resources Without Limits or ThrottlingCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd-secondary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- FloodingCAPEC-125likelihood: High · Medium
- Excessive AllocationCAPEC-130likelihood: Medium · Medium
- XML Ping of the DeathCAPEC-147likelihood: Low · Medium
- Exponential Data ExpansionCAPEC-197likelihood: High · Medium
- Serialized Data Parameter BlowupCAPEC-229likelihood: High · High
- Serialized Data with Nested PayloadsCAPEC-230likelihood: Medium · High
- Oversized Serialized Data PayloadsCAPEC-231likelihood: Medium · High
- HTTP DoSCAPEC-469Low
ATT&CK techniques
- Network Denial of Service:Direct Network FloodT1498.001
- Network Denial of Service:Reflection AmplificationT1498.002
- Endpoint Denial of ServiceT1499
- Endpoint Denial of Service: OS Exhaustion FloodT1499.001
- Endpoint Denial of Service:Service Exhaustion FloodT1499.002
- Endpoint Denial of Service:Application Exhaustion FloodT1499.003
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
For records you follow, these changes also arrive as notifications. →
References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.