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NVD / CVE Program· CNA GitHub_M

CVE-2024-32962: XML signature verification bypass due improper verification of signature / signature spoofing

CriticalCVSS 10.0 · v3.1—Proof of concept Fix available

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Plan (action score 40/100)

  • Public proof-of-concept code exists (GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
  • Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.83% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 58% of all records.
  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
  • According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
  • Fixed version: node-saml xml-crypto 6.0.0.

Add it to your regular patch cycle. Upgrade to node-saml xml-crypto 6.0.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

xml-crypto is an xml digital signature and encryption library for Node.js. In affected versions the default configuration does not check authorization of the signer, it only checks the validity of the signature per section 3.2.2 of the w3 xmldsig-core-20080610 spec. As such, without additional validation steps, the default configuration allows a malicious actor to re-sign an XML document, place the certificate in a `<KeyInfo />` element, and pass `xml-crypto` default validation checks. As a result `xml-crypto` trusts by default any certificate provided via digitally signed XML document's `<KeyInfo />`. `xml-crypto` prefers to use any certificate provided via digitally signed XML document's `<KeyInfo />` even if library was configured to use specific certificate (`publicCert`) for signature verification purposes. An attacker can spoof signature verification by modifying XML document and replacing existing signature with signature generated with malicious private key (created by attacker) and by attaching that private key's certificate to `<KeyInfo />` element. This vulnerability is combination of changes introduced to `4.0.0` on pull request 301 / commit `c2b83f98` and has been addressed in version 6.0.0 with pull request 445 / commit `21201723d`. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may either check the certificate extracted via `getCertFromKeyInfo` against trusted certificates before accepting the results of the validation or set `xml-crypto's getCertFromKeyInfo` to `() => undefined` forcing `xml-crypto` to use an explicitly configured `publicCert` or `privateKey` for signature verification.

Published
May 2, 2024
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
0.8% · 58th percentile

Report tools

JSON

Action score

40

Plan

Add it to your regular patch cycle.

CVSS
40 / 40 · 10.0 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.8%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
proof of concept
Automatable
yes
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · GitHub_M
10.0
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Get told when this record changes

  • Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
  • Proof of concept exists, no weaponized module
  • A fix has been released

If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.

Follow CVE-2024-32962

When you'll hear from us

  • when it enters CISA KEV
  • when exploit code appears or is weaponized
  • when the record is updated (including a fixed version)
  • when EPSS rises 20 points in a week

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.

VendorProduct
node saml projectxml crypto

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • node-saml xml-crypto

    • >= 4.0.0, < 6.0.0affected

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
npmxml-cryptofrom 4.0.0 · before 6.0.06.0.0

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2025-29775xml-crypto Vulnerable to XML Signature Verification Bypass via DigestValue Comment
    40Plan
  • CVE-2025-29774xml-crypto Vulnerable to XML Signature Verification Bypass via Multiple SignedInfo References
    40Plan

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
node-saml xml-crypto6.0.0 · descriptionVendor (CNA)
npm:xml-crypto6.0.0Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

Proof of concept available

A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.

Evidence

  • Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1

Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.

Public exploit evidence
SourceKindDate
Proof-of-concept repository on GitHubstars:02025-03-20

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

  1. Published
  2. First PoC+322 d
  3. TodayNov 12, 2026+925 d

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

  • CVE-2025-29774316 days apartxml-crypto Vulnerable to XML Signature Verification Bypass via Multiple SignedInfo References
    40Plan
  • CVE-2025-29775316 days apartxml-crypto Vulnerable to XML Signature Verification Bypass via DigestValue Comment
    40Plan

Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · public bounty program.

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • No account or password is required.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
high · data can be read
Integrity
high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability
none

Impact can extend beyond the vulnerable component (scope changes).

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
None
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality impact
High
Integrity impact
High
Availability impact
None

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

nvd-secondary

Root cause

The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);

Fixed

ts
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {  algorithms: ["RS256"],  issuer: "https://id.example.com",  audience: "portal",});

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

References

All records