CVE-2023-42806: Snapshot signature not including HeadID will allow replay attacks
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 26/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.51% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. Administrator privileges are required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Hydra is the layer-two scalability solution for Cardano. Prior to version 0.13.0, not signing and verifying `$\mathsf{cid}$` allows an attacker (which must be a participant of this head) to use a snapshot from an old head instance with the same participants to close the head or contest the state with it. This can lead to an incorrect distribution of value (= value extraction attack; hard, but possible) or prevent the head to finalize because the value available is not consistent with the closed utxo state (= denial of service; easy). A patch is planned for version 0.13.0. As a workaround, rotate keys between heads so not to re-use keys and not result in the same multi-signature participants.
- Published
- Sep 21, 2023
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.5% · 44th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-347
Report tools
Action score
26
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 26 / 40 · 6.5 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.5%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- no
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 6.5
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 6.5
- agree
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| iohk | hydra | cpe:2.3:a:iohk:hydra |
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
input-output-hk hydra
- < 0.13.0affected
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- iohk hydrabefore 0.13.0
Same product
iohk: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2023-38701Hydra's committed UTxOs at Commit validator and UTxOs at Initial validator can be spent arbitrarily by anyone36Monitor
- CVE-2023-42449Malicious head initialiser can extract PTs from control of Hydra scripts, leading to locked participant commits or spoofed commits32Monitor
- CVE-2023-42448Hydra's contestation period in head datum can be modified during Close transaction, allowing malicious participant to freely modify the contestation deadline32Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- Administrator privileges are required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- High
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic SignatureCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
The verifier takes the algorithm to verify with from the token’s own header. Untrusted data ends up deciding its own verification rule.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-347 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey);Fixed
const claims = jwt.verify(token, publicKey, {
algorithms: ["RS256"],
issuer: "https://id.example.com",
audience: "portal",
});Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
- github.com/input-output-hk/hydra/blob/ec6c7a2ab651462228475d0b34264e9a182c22bb/hydra-node/src/Hydra/Snapshot.hs#L50-L54
- github.com/input-output-hk/hydra/blob/ec6c7a2ab651462228475d0b34264e9a182c22bb/hydra-plutus/src/Hydra/Contract/Head.hs#L583-L599
- github.com/input-output-hk/hydra/security/advisories/GHSA-gr36-mc6v-72qq
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.