Unnamed "Subscription" operation results in Denial-of-Service in apollographql/router
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 23/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.80% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 56.3% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: apollo-router (crates.io) 1.29.1.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to apollo-router (crates.io) 1.29.1 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
The Apollo Router is a configurable, high-performance graph router written in Rust to run a federated supergraph that uses Apollo Federation 2. Affected versions are subject to a Denial-of-Service (DoS) type vulnerability which causes the Router to panic and terminate when GraphQL Subscriptions are enabled. It can be triggered when **all of the following conditions are met**: 1. Running Apollo Router v1.28.0, v1.28.1 or v1.29.0 ("impacted versions"); **and** 2. The Supergraph schema provided to the Router (either via Apollo Uplink or explicitly via other configuration) **has a `subscription` type** with root-fields defined; **and** 3. The YAML configuration provided to the Router **has subscriptions enabled** (they are _disabled_ by default), either by setting `enabled: true` _or_ by setting a valid `mode` within the `subscriptions` object (as seen in [subscriptions' documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/router/executing-operations/subscription-support/#router-setup)); **and** 4. An [anonymous](https://spec.graphql.org/draft/#sec-Anonymous-Operation-Definitions) (i.e., un-named) `subscription` operation (e.g., `subscription { ... }`) is received by the Router If **all four** of these criteria are met, the impacted versions will panic and terminate. There is no data-privacy risk or sensitive-information exposure aspect to this vulnerability. This is fixed in Apollo Router v1.29.1. Users are advised to upgrade. Updating to v1.29.1 should be a clear and simple upgrade path for those running impacted versions. However, if Subscriptions are **not** necessary for your Graph – but are enabled via configuration — then disabling subscriptions is another option to mitigate the risk.
- Published
- Sep 5, 2023
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.8% · 56th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-755
Report tools
Action score
23
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 23 / 40 · 5.9 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.8%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 5.9
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 7.5
- 1.6 point gap
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| apollographql | apollo router | cpe:2.3:a:apollographql:apollo_router |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apollographql apollo router1.28.0 and later · before 1.29.1
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
apollographql router
- >= 1.28.0, < 1.29.1affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | apollo-router | from 1.28.0 · before 1.29.1 | 1.29.1 |
Same product
apollographql: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2024-28101Apollo Router's Compressed Payloads do not respect HTTP Payload Limits30Monitor
- CVE-2023-45812Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions in apollo-router30Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| crates.io:apollo-router | 1.29.1 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-755 · Improper Handling of Exceptional ConditionsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
nvd-primary
Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (2 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.