CVE-2023-37895: Apache Jackrabbit RMI access can lead to RCE
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Plan (action score 40/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 3.2% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 88.2% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Jackrabbit Standalone (jackrabbit-standalone and jackrabbit-standalone-components) 2.20.11, 2.21.18; Apache Software Foundation Apache Jackrabbit Webapp (jackrabbit-webapp) 2.20.11, 2.21.18.
Add it to your regular patch cycle. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Jackrabbit Standalone (jackrabbit-standalone and jackrabbit-standalone-components) 2.20.11, 2.21.18; Apache Software Foundation Apache Jackrabbit Webapp (jackrabbit-webapp) 2.20.11, 2.21.18 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Java object deserialization issue in Jackrabbit webapp/standalone on all platforms allows attacker to remotely execute code via RMIVersions up to (including) 2.20.10 (stable branch) and 2.21.17 (unstable branch) use the component "commons-beanutils", which contains a class that can be used for remote code execution over RMI. Users are advised to immediately update to versions 2.20.11 or 2.21.18. Note that earlier stable branches (1.0.x .. 2.18.x) have been EOLd already and do not receive updates anymore. In general, RMI support can expose vulnerabilities by the mere presence of an exploitable class on the classpath. Even if Jackrabbit itself does not contain any code known to be exploitable anymore, adding other components to your server can expose the same type of problem. We therefore recommend to disable RMI access altogether (see further below), and will discuss deprecating RMI support in future Jackrabbit releases. How to check whether RMI support is enabledRMI support can be over an RMI-specific TCP port, and over an HTTP binding. Both are by default enabled in Jackrabbit webapp/standalone. The native RMI protocol by default uses port 1099. To check whether it is enabled, tools like "netstat" can be used to check. RMI-over-HTTP in Jackrabbit by default uses the path "/rmi". So when running standalone on port 8080, check whether an HTTP GET request on localhost:8080/rmi returns 404 (not enabled) or 200 (enabled). Note that the HTTP path may be different when the webapp is deployed in a container as non-root context, in which case the prefix is under the user's control. Turning off RMIFind web.xml (either in JAR/WAR file or in unpacked web application folder), and remove the declaration and the mapping definition for the RemoteBindingServlet: <servlet> <servlet-name>RMI</servlet-name> <servlet-class>org.apache.jackrabbit.servlet.remote.RemoteBindingServlet</servlet-class> </servlet> <servlet-mapping> <servlet-name>RMI</servlet-name> <url-pattern>/rmi</url-pattern> </servlet-mapping> Find the bootstrap.properties file (in $REPOSITORY_HOME), and set rmi.enabled=false and also remove rmi.host rmi.port rmi.url-pattern If there is no file named bootstrap.properties in $REPOSITORY_HOME, it is located somewhere in the classpath. In this case, place a copy in $REPOSITORY_HOME and modify it as explained.
- Published
- Jul 25, 2023
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 3.2% · 88th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-502
Report tools
Action score
40
Plan
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 3.2%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- total
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| apache | jackrabbit | cpe:2.3:a:apache:jackrabbit |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- apache jackrabbit1.0.0 and later · before 2.20.11
- apache jackrabbit2.21.0 and later · before 2.21.18
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Apache Software Foundation Apache Jackrabbit Standalone (jackrabbit-standalone and jackrabbit-standalone-components)
- 2.21.0 and later · before 2.21.18affected · maven
- 1.0.0 and later · before 2.20.11affected · maven
Apache Software Foundation Apache Jackrabbit Webapp (jackrabbit-webapp)
- 2.21.0 and later · before 2.21.18affected · maven
- 1.0.0 and later · before 2.20.11affected · maven
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Debian:12 | jackrabbit | from 0 | — |
| Debian:13 | jackrabbit | before 2.20.11-1 | 2.20.11-1 |
| Maven | org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-standalone | from 1.0.0 · before 2.20.11 | 2.20.11 |
| Maven | org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-standalone | from 2.21.0 · before 2.21.18 | 2.21.18 |
| Maven | org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-standalone-components | from 1.0.0 · before 2.20.11 | 2.20.11 |
| Maven | org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-standalone-components | from 2.21.0 · before 2.21.18 | 2.21.18 |
| Maven | org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-webapp | from 1.0.0 · before 2.20.11 | 2.20.11 |
| Maven | org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-webapp | from 2.21.0 · before 2.21.18 | 2.21.18 |
Same product
apache: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2015-1833XML external entity (XXE) vulnerability in Apache Jackrabbit before 2.0.6, 2.2.x before 2.2.14, 2.4.x before 2.4.6, 2.6.x before 2.6.6, 2.8.42Plan
- CVE-2026-92414Apache Jackrabbit: Pre-auth hijack of cached sessions via derivable WebDAV lock tokens37Monitor
- CVE-2016-6801Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the CSRF content-type check in Jackrabbit-Webdav in Apache Jackrabbit 2.4.x before 2.4.6,36Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2009-0026Jan 21, 2009 · Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in Apache Jackrabbit before 1.5.2 allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script 25Monitor
- Later →CVE-2025-53689Jul 14, 2025 · Apache Jackrabbit: XXE vulnerability in jackrabbit-spi-commons35Monitor
- Later →CVE-2025-58782Sep 8, 2025 · Apache Jackrabbit Core, Apache Jackrabbit JCR Commons: JNDI injection risk with JndiRepositoryFactory26Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Jackrabbit Standalone (jackrabbit-standalone and jackrabbit-standalone-components) | 2.20.11 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Jackrabbit Standalone (jackrabbit-standalone and jackrabbit-standalone-components) | 2.21.18 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Jackrabbit Webapp (jackrabbit-webapp) | 2.20.11 | Vendor (CNA) |
| Apache Software Foundation Apache Jackrabbit Webapp (jackrabbit-webapp) | 2.21.18 | Vendor (CNA) |
| debian:jackrabbit | 2.20.11-1 · Debian:13 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-standalone | 2.20.11 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-standalone | 2.21.18 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-standalone-components | 2.20.11 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-standalone-components | 2.21.18 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-webapp | 2.20.11 | Package registry (OSV) |
| Maven:org.apache.jackrabbit:jackrabbit-webapp | 2.21.18 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Manfred Baedkeother
- Siebene@reporter
- Michael Dürigother
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-502 · Deserialization of Untrusted DataCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
Data received over the network is deserialized into the language’s native object format without verifying its source. Code paths inside the object can be triggered during deserialization.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-502 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
payload = sock.recv(65536)
job = pickle.loads(payload)Fixed
payload = sock.recv(65536)
if not hmac.compare_digest(sign(payload), header_sig):
raise PermissionError("invalid signature")
job = JobSchema.validate(json.loads(payload))Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (3 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.