NVD / CVE Program· CNA apache

CVE-2023-31038: Apache Log4cxx: SQL injection when using ODBC appender

Noroxi assessment

Priority: Monitor (action score 35/100)

The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 1.5% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 75.9% of all records.
Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
Fixed version: Apache Software Foundation Apache Log4cxx 1.1.0.

Low priority for now. Upgrade to Apache Software Foundation Apache Log4cxx 1.1.0 or later.

Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it

Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS

SQL injection in Log4cxx when using the ODBC appender to send log messages to a database. No fields sent to the database were properly escaped for SQL injection. This has been the case since at least version 0.9.0(released 2003-08-06) Note that Log4cxx is a C++ framework, so only C++ applications are affected. Before version 1.1.0, the ODBC appender was automatically part of Log4cxx if the library was found when compiling the library. As of version 1.1.0, this must be both explicitly enabled in order to be compiled in. Three preconditions must be met for this vulnerability to be possible: 1. Log4cxx compiled with ODBC support(before version 1.1.0, this was auto-detected at compile time) 2. ODBCAppender enabled for logging messages to, generally done via a config file 3. User input is logged at some point. If your application does not have user input, it is unlikely to be affected. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.1.0 which properly binds the parameters to the SQL statement, or migrate to the new DBAppender class which supports an ODBC connection in addition to other databases. Note that this fix does require a configuration file update, as the old configuration files will not configure properly. An example is shown below, and more information may be found in the Log4cxx documentation on the ODBCAppender. Example of old configuration snippet: <appender name="SqlODBCAppender" class="ODBCAppender"> <param name="sql" value="INSERT INTO logs (message) VALUES ('%m')" /> ... other params here ... </appender> The migrated configuration snippet with new ColumnMapping parameters: <appender name="SqlODBCAppender" class="ODBCAppender"> <param name="sql" value="INSERT INTO logs (message) VALUES (?)" /> <param name="ColumnMapping" value="message"/> ... other params here ... </appender>

HighCVSS 8.8 · v3.1—No exploit Fix available

SQL injection

Published: May 8, 2023
Updated: Jun 17, 2026
EPSS: 1.5% · 75th percentile
CWE: CWE-89

Report tools

JSON

Action score

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS: 35 / 40 · 8.8 / 10
CISA KEV: 0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS: 0 / 30 · 1.5%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical impact: total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

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No public exploit code on record
A fix has been released

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Noroxi analysis

What does it mean in your environment?

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Affected systems

Is your version affected?

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Vendor	Product	CPE
apache	log4cxx	cpe:2.3:a:apache:log4cxx

Affected versions

NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.

apache log4cxx0.9.0 and later · before 1.1.0

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (apache). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

Apache Software Foundation Apache Log4cxx
- 0.9.0 and later · before 1.1.0affected · semver

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

Ecosystem	Package	Affected range	Fix
Debian:12	log4cxx	from 0	—
Debian:13	log4cxx	before 1.1.0-1	1.1.0-1
openSUSE:Tumbleweed	log4cxx	before 1.1.0-1.1	1.1.0-1.1

Same product

apache: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

CVE-2026-40023Apache Log4cxx, Apache Log4cxx (Conan), Apache Log4cxx (Brew): Silent log event loss in XMLLayout due to unescaped XML 1.0 forbidden characters
25Monitor
CVE-2025-54813Apache Log4cxx: Improper escaping with JSONLayout
25Monitor
CVE-2025-54812Apache Log4cxx: Improper HTML escaping in HTMLLayout
8Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / package	Fixed version	Source
Apache Software Foundation Apache Log4cxx	1.1.0	Vendor (CNA)
debian:log4cxx	1.1.0-1 · Debian:13	Package registry (OSV)
opensuse:log4cxx	1.1.0-1.1 · openSUSE:Tumbleweed	Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
A low-privileged account is enough.
No user action is required.
No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality: high · data can be read
Integrity: high · data or configuration can be modified
Availability: high · the service can be disrupted

Attack vector: Network
Attack complexity: Low
Privileges required: Low
User interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality impact: High
Integrity impact: High
Availability impact: High

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-89 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

nvd-primary

Root cause

The query text is built by concatenating user input. The database cannot tell where the data ends and the command begins.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-89 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

1const owner = req.query.owner;
2const rows = await db.query(
3  "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = '" + owner + "'"
4);

Fixed

1const owner = req.query.owner;
2const rows = await db.query(
3  "SELECT * FROM files WHERE owner = $1",
4  [owner]
5);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Attack patterns (CAPEC)

ATT&CK techniques

—

Change log

Fix✗ → ✓Sep 28, 2026, 10:08 PM UTC

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