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CVE-2023-22650· NVD / CVE Program· CNA suse

Rancher does not automatically clean up a user deleted or disabled from the configured Authentication Provider

A vulnerability has been identified in which Rancher does not automatically clean up a user which has been deleted from the configured authentication provider (AP). This characteristic also applies to disabled or revoked users, Rancher will not reflect these modifications which may leave the user’s tokens still usable.

HighCVSS 8.7 · v4.0—No exploit Fix available
Published
Oct 16, 2024
Updated
Jun 17, 2026
EPSS
0.6% · 47th percentile
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Report tools

JSON

Action score

34

Monitor

Low priority for now.

CVSS
34 / 40 · 8.7 / 10
CISA KEV
0 / 30 · Not listed
EPSS
0 / 30 · 0.6%

CISA SSVC decision

Exploitation
none
Automatable
no
Technical impact
total

Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.

CNA vs NVD score

NVD
—
CNA · suse
8.8
NVD has not scored this yet; the score shown is the CNA’s.

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.

Affected systems

VendorProduct
suserancher

Versions reported by the vendor

Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (suse). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.

  • SUSE rancher

    • 2.7.0 and later · before 2.7.14affected · semver
    • 2.8.0 and later · before 2.8.5affected · semver

Package-level exposure

OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.

EcosystemPackageAffected rangeFix
Gogithub.com/rancher/rancherfrom 2.7.0 · before 2.7.142.7.14
Gogithub.com/rancher/rancherfrom 2.8.0 · before 2.8.52.8.5
Gogithub.com/rancher/rancherall versions—

Same product

suse: all records

Other highest-scoring records for the same primary product.

  • CVE-2022-43755Rancher: Non-random authentication token
    40Plan
  • CVE-2021-36782Rancher: Plaintext storage and exposure of credentials in Rancher API and cluster.management.cattle.io object
    40Plan
  • CVE-2026-41050Helm impersonation bypass of `RESTClientGetter` retains `cluster-admin` during template rendering
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2025-62878Local Path Provisioner vulnerable to Path Traversal via parameters.pathPattern
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2023-22651Improper Privilege Management vulnerability in SUSE Rancher allows Privilege Escalation.
    39Monitor
  • CVE-2021-36783Rancher: Failure to properly sanitize credentials in cluster template answers
    39Monitor

Remediation

Which version to upgrade to

Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.

Product / packageFixed versionSource
SUSE rancher2.7.14Vendor (CNA)
SUSE rancher2.8.5Vendor (CNA)
Go:github.com/rancher/rancher2.7.14Package registry (OSV)
Go:github.com/rancher/rancher2.8.5Package registry (OSV)

Exploit status

No known public exploit

No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.

Research context

For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.

Timeline

From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.

No dated events beyond publication.

EPSS, last 120 days

FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).

Patch and commit links

Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.

No commit or PR link among the references.

Credits

All researchers

Finders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.

No credits in the CNA record.

Variant candidates

Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.

No nightly-computed relations.

Chain candidates

An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.

—

Bug bounty scope

No known public program.

Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).

Technical details

Attack conditions

  • Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
  • A low-privileged account is enough.
  • No user action is required.
  • No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.

If successful

Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
X

Weakness class (CWE)

CWE-287 · Improper Authentication

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

nvd-secondary

Root cause

Authentication is added route by route instead of being enforced in one place. When a route added later bypasses the shared middleware, the session check never runs for it.

The bug in code

The whole CWE-287 class

A representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.

Vulnerable

ts
app.use("/admin", requireSession, adminRouter);
// Route added later skips the middlewareapp.post("/admin-api/config", updateConfig);

Fixed

ts
const admin = express.Router();admin.use(requireSession, requireRole("admin"));
admin.post("/config", updateConfig);app.use("/admin", admin);

Attack context

MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.

Noroxi analysis

No Noroxi analysis for this record yet

We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.

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Change log

  1. Fix✗ → ✓

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References

Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.

All records