CVE-2022-21700: Memory leak in micronaut-core
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 1.1% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 66.9% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to CISA the attack is automatable: targets can be found by mass scanning.
- Fixed version: io.micronaut:micronaut-http (Maven) 3.2.7.
Low priority for now. Upgrade to io.micronaut:micronaut-http (Maven) 3.2.7 or later.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Micronaut is a JVM-based, full stack Java framework designed for building JVM web applications with support for Java, Kotlin and the Groovy language. In affected versions sending an invalid Content Type header leads to memory leak in DefaultArgumentConversionContext as this type is erroneously used in static state. ### Impact Sending an invalid Content Type header leads to memory leak in `DefaultArgumentConversionContext` as this type is erroneously used in static state. ### Patches The problem is patched in Micronaut 3.2.7 and above. ### Workarounds The default content type binder can be replaced in an existing Micronaut application to mitigate the issue: ```java package example; import java.util.List; import io.micronaut.context.annotation.Replaces; import io.micronaut.core.convert.ConversionService; import io.micronaut.http.MediaType; import io.micronaut.http.bind.DefaultRequestBinderRegistry; import io.micronaut.http.bind.binders.RequestArgumentBinder; import jakarta.inject.Singleton; @Singleton @Replaces(DefaultRequestBinderRegistry.class) class FixedRequestBinderRegistry extends DefaultRequestBinderRegistry { public FixedRequestBinderRegistry(ConversionService conversionService, List<RequestArgumentBinder> binders) { super(conversionService, binders); } @Override protected void registerDefaultConverters(ConversionService<?> conversionService) { super.registerDefaultConverters(conversionService); conversionService.addConverter(CharSequence.class, MediaType.class, charSequence -> { try { return MediaType.of(charSequence); } catch (IllegalArgumentException e) { return null; } }); } } ``` ### References Commit that introduced the vulnerability https://github.com/micronaut-projects/micronaut-core/commit/b8ec32c311689667c69ae7d9f9c3b3a8abc96fe3 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Micronaut Core](https://github.com/micronaut-projects/micronaut-core/issues) * Email us at [info@micronaut.io](mailto:info@micronaut.io)
- Published
- Jan 18, 2022
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.1% · 66th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-400
Report tools
Action score
21
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 1.1%
CISA SSVC decision
- Exploitation
- none
- Automatable
- yes
- Technical impact
- partial
Vulnrichment: CISA's decision-tree inputs.
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 5.3
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 5.3
- agree
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- A fix has been released
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| objectcomputing | micronaut | cpe:2.3:a:objectcomputing:micronaut |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- objectcomputing micronautbefore 3.2.7
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
micronaut-projects micronaut-core
- < 3.2.7affected
Package-level exposure
OSV and GitHub Advisory data: ecosystem, package and range. SBOM matching uses this table.
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected range | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | io.micronaut:micronaut-http | before 3.2.7 | 3.2.7 |
Same product
objectcomputing: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2020-7611All versions of io.micronaut:micronaut-http-client before 1.2.11 and all versions from 1.3.0 before 1.3.2 are vulnerable to HTTP Request Hea40Plan
- CVE-2026-33013Micronaut vulnerable to DoS via crafted form-urlencoded body binding with descending array indices32Monitor
- CVE-2024-23639micronaut-core management endpoints vulnerable to drive-by localhost attack31Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2021-32769Jul 16, 2021 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') in micronaut-core31Monitor
- Later →CVE-2026-33012Mar 20, 2026 · Micronaut Framework vulnerable to a Denial of Service in HTML error response caching30Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
| Product / package | Fixed version | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Maven:io.micronaut:micronaut-http | 3.2.7 | Package registry (OSV) |
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
No credits in the CNA record.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- low · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- Low
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-400 · Uncontrolled Resource ConsumptionCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
nvd-primary
Root cause
Code that parses nested structures sets no depth or size limit. A small input can turn into a disproportionate processing load.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-400 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
function expand(node) {
return node.children.map(expand);
}Fixed
const MAX_DEPTH = 32;
function expand(node, depth = 0) {
if (depth > MAX_DEPTH) throw new Error("too deep");
return node.children.map((c) => expand(c, depth + 1));
}Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
- Fix✗ → ✓
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References
Show all references (1 more)Show less
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.