CVE-2022-2034: Sensei LMS < 4.5.0 - Unauthenticated Private Messages Disclosure via Rest API
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 22/100)
- A ready-made attack module is public (Nuclei); exploiting it takes no special expertise.
- Public proof-of-concept code exists (Exploit-DB / GitHub); there is no record of exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 2.6% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 85.8% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
The Sensei LMS WordPress plugin before 4.5.0 does not have proper permissions set in one of its REST endpoint, allowing unauthenticated users to access private messages sent to teachers
- Published
- Aug 29, 2022
- Updated
- Jun 17, 2026
- EPSS
- 2.6% · 85th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-639
Report tools
Action score
22
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 1 / 30 · 2.6%
Is Sensei LMS – Online Courses, Quizzes, & Learning on your site?
WP Lens reads your site's plugin, theme and WordPress versions from the outside and matches them to known vulnerabilities. Works without an account.
Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| automattic | sensei lms | cpe:2.3:a:automattic:sensei_lms |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- automattic sensei lmsbefore 4.5.0
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (WPScan). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Unknown Sensei LMS
- before 4.5.0affected
Same product
automattic: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2024-7786Sensei LMS < 4.24.2 - Unauthenticated Email Template Leak22Monitor
- CVE-2026-112329Sensei LMS 4.26.4 Broken Access Control via save_new_message21Monitor
- CVE-2026-112328Sensei LMS 4.26.4 Broken Access Control via add_new_module_term AJAX21Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- Later →CVE-2022-2080Aug 29, 2022 · Sensei LMS < 4.5.2 - Arbitrary Private Message Sending via IDOR17Monitor
- Later →CVE-2023-50875Feb 12, 2024 · WordPress Sensei LMS Plugin <= 4.17.0 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS)21Monitor
- Later →CVE-2024-35686Aug 18, 2024 · WordPress Sensei LMS plugin <= 4.23.1 - Broken Access Control vulnerability21Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Nuclei detection template ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Nuclei detection template | Nuclei template CVE-2022-2034 | — |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- Veshraj Ghimirefinder
- WPScancoordinator
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
The product’s vendor appears in a public program. Matched by name; verify the scope text in the program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled KeyCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
The endpoint fetches the record by the ID sent in the request, but never checks whether the record belongs to the requesting user.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-639 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const invoice = await Invoice.findById(req.params.id);
res.json(invoice);Fixed
const invoice = await Invoice.findOne({
id: req.params.id,
ownerId: req.user.id,
});
if (!invoice) return res.sendStatus(404);
res.json(invoice);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
MITRE has no CAPEC/ATT&CK mapping for this CWE.
Change log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.