CVE-2021-33540: Phoenix Contact: Undocumented FTP acces in certain AXL F BK and IL BK devices
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 29/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.72% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 54.2% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
In certain devices of the Phoenix Contact AXL F BK and IL BK product families an undocumented password protected FTP access to the root directory exists.
- Published
- Jun 25, 2021
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.7% · 54th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-798
Report tools
Action score
29
Monitor
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 29 / 40 · 7.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.7%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 7.3
- CNA · CERTVDE
- 7.3
- agree
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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Noroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk pn tps xc firmware | cpe:2.3:o:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_pn_tps_xc_firmware |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk pn tps xc | cpe:2.3:h:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_pn_tps_xc |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk pn tps firmware | cpe:2.3:o:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_pn_tps_firmware |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk pn tps | cpe:2.3:h:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_pn_tps |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk eip firmware | cpe:2.3:o:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_eip_firmware |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk eip | cpe:2.3:h:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_eip |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk eip ef firmware | cpe:2.3:o:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_eip_ef_firmware |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk eip ef | cpe:2.3:h:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_eip_ef |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk eth firmware | cpe:2.3:o:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_eth_firmware |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk eth | cpe:2.3:h:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_eth |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk eth xc firmware | cpe:2.3:o:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_eth_xc_firmware |
| phoenixcontact | axl f bk eth xc | cpe:2.3:h:phoenixcontact:axl_f_bk_eth_xc |
and 24 more
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- phoenixcontact axl f bk eip ef firmwarebefore 1.30
- phoenixcontact axl f bk eip firmwarebefore 1.30
- phoenixcontact axl f bk eth firmwarebefore 1.30
- phoenixcontact axl f bk eth net2 firmwareall versions
- phoenixcontact axl f bk eth xc firmwarebefore 1.30
- phoenixcontact axl f bk pn firmwareall versions
- phoenixcontact axl f bk pn tps firmwarebefore 1.30
- phoenixcontact axl f bk pn tps xc firmwarebefore 1.30
- phoenixcontact axl f bk pn xc firmwareall versions
- phoenixcontact axl f bk s35 firmwarebefore 1.40
- phoenixcontact axl f bk sas firmwareall versions
- phoenixcontact il eip bk di8 do4 2tx-pac firmwareall versions
- phoenixcontact il eth bk di8 do4 2tx-pac firmwareall versions
- phoenixcontact il eth bk di8 do4 2tx-xc-pac firmwareall versions
- phoenixcontact il pn bk di8 do4 2scrj-pac firmwareall versions
- phoenixcontact il pn bk di8 do4 2tx-pac firmwareall versions
- phoenixcontact il pn bk-pac firmwareall versions
- phoenixcontact il s3 bk di8 do4 2tx-pac firmwareall versions
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (CERTVDE). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Phoenix Contact AXL F BK
- AXL F PN (2701815) all revisions, AXL F PN XC (2701222) all revisions, AXL F ETH NET2 (2702177) all revisions, AXL F SAS (2701457) all revisionsaffected
- AXL F PN TPS XC (1068857) and later · before 1.30affected
- AXL F EIP EF (2702782) and later · before 1.30affected
- AXL F PN TPS (2403869) and later · before 1.30affected
- AXL F EIP (2688394) and later · before 1.30affected
- AXL F ETH (2688459) and later · before 1.30affected
- AXL F ETH XC (2701949) and later · before 1.30affected
- AXL F S3 (2701686) and later · before 1.40affected
Phoenix Contact IL
- IL PN BK-PAC (2403696) all revisions, IL PN BK DI8 DO4 2TX-PAC (2703994) all revisions, IL PN BK DI8 DO4 2SCRJ-PAC (2878379) all revisions, IL ETH BK DI8 DO4 2TX-XC-PAC (2701388) all revisions, IL ETH BK DI8 DO4 2TX-PAC (2703981) all revisions, IL EIP BK DI8 DO4 2TX-PAC (2897758) all revisions, IL S3 BK DI8 DO4 2TX-PAC (2692380) all revisionsaffected
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
No history yet (it accumulates with the daily EPSS job).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
No commit or PR link among the references.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
- CERT@VDEthis publication.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- low · data can be read
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- low · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- Low
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- Low
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-798 · Use of Hard-coded CredentialsCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
nvd-primary
Root cause
For convenience in support or manufacturing, an account that is identical on every device is embedded in the software. Credentials learned from one device work on all of them.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-798 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
const SUPPORT_USER = "support";
const SUPPORT_PASS = "hardcoded-password";Fixed
const creds = await provisioning.deviceCredentials(deviceId);
if (creds.mustRotate) await forcePasswordChange(deviceId);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Change log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.