PublishPress Capabilities < 2.3.1 - Unauthenticated Arbitrary Options Update to Blog Compromise
The PublishPress Capabilities WordPress plugin before 2.3.1, PublishPress Capabilities Pro WordPress plugin before 2.3.1 does not have authorisation and CSRF checks when updating the plugin's settings via the init hook, and does not ensure that the options to be updated belong to the plugin. As a result, unauthenticated attackers could update arbitrary blog options, such as the default role and make any new registered user with an administrator role.
- Published
- Jan 10, 2022
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 6.7% · 94th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-352
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Report tools
Action score
41
Plan
Add it to your regular patch cycle.
- CVSS
- 39 / 40 · 9.8 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 2 / 30 · 6.7%
Affected systems
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| publishpress | capabilities | cpe:2.3:a:publishpress:capabilities |
Affected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- publishpress capabilitiesbefore 2.3.1
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (WPScan). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
Unknown PublishPress Capabilities – User Role Access, Editor Permissions, Admin Menus
- 2.0 and later · before 2.0*affected
- 2.3.1 and later · before 2.3.1affected
Unknown PublishPress Capabilities Pro
- 2.0 and later · before 2.0*affected
- 2.3.1 and later · before 2.3.1affected
Same product
publishpress: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2022-3366PublishPress Capabilities < 2.5.2 - Admin+ PHP Objection Injection28Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
Proof of concept available
A public proof of concept or detection signature exists. Exploit knowledge is out there; don't delay patching.
Evidence
- Nuclei detection template ×1
- Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub ×1
Noroxi does not host or link to exploit code. Metasploit module names and Nuclei template ids are shown (names, not code); Exploit-DB entries and PoC repositories are given as counts only.
| Source | Kind | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Nuclei detection template | Nuclei template CVE-2021-25032 | — |
| Proof-of-concept repository on GitHub | stars:0 | 2023-08-09 |
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
- Published
- First PoC+575 d
- TodaySep 29, 2026+1723 d
FIRST EPSS daily score; only changes of 0.01 or more are recorded (step chart).
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
Credits
All researchersFinders, reporters and analysts named in the CNA record. Click a name for that researcher’s other records.
Variant candidates
Same product, same weakness class, within 18 months. If the patch missed the root cause, the sibling bug is here.
No nightly-computed relations.
Chain candidates
An authentication bypass and a privilege-requiring bug in the same product, published close together: combined they may become an unauthenticated path.
—
Bug bounty scope
No known public program.
Source: bounty-targets-data (public HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Intigriti, YesWeHack listings).
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- high · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- high · the service can be disrupted
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- High
- Availability impact
- High
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-352 · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
nvd-primary
Root cause
State-changing requests rely on the session cookie the browser sends automatically; nothing verifies that the request came from the user’s own page.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-352 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true } }));app.post("/account/address", updateAddress);Fixed
app.use(session({ cookie: { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax" } }));app.post("/account/address", csrfProtection, updateAddress);Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Noroxi analysis
No Noroxi analysis for this record yet
We don't hand-write analysis for all 385,000+ vulnerabilities; that wouldn't be honest. For notable, high-impact vulnerabilities our team writes the mechanism, detection and remediation steps.
We use this product, ask for helpChange log
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.