CVE-2020-28942: An issue exists in PrimeKey EJBCA before 7.4.3 when enrolling with EST while proxied through an RA over the Peers protocol.
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 17/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.36% (FIRST EPSS).
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. A low-privileged account is enough. No user action is required. No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
- According to the record, no fixed version is available yet.
Low priority for now. Update when a fix is released; follow the vendor's advisory.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
An issue exists in PrimeKey EJBCA before 7.4.3 when enrolling with EST while proxied through an RA over the Peers protocol. As a part of EJBCA's domain security model, the peer connector allows the restriction of client certificates (for the RA, not the end user) to a limited set of allowed CAs, thus restricting the accessibility of that RA to the rights it has within a specific role. While this works for other protocols such as CMP, it was found that the EJBCA enrollment over an EST implementation bypasses this check, allowing enrollment with a valid client certificate through any functioning and authenticated RA connected to the CA. NOTE: an attacker must already have a trusted client certificate and authorization to enroll against the targeted CA.
- Published
- Nov 19, 2020
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 0.3% · 30th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-295
Report tools
Action score
17
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 17 / 40 · 4.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 0.3%
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
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What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
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| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| primekey | ejbca | cpe:2.3:a:primekey:ejbca |
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This vulnerability is about certificate validation or weak cryptography. The free SSL checker tests your certificate, enabled TLS versions and weak ciphers.
Run the SSL checkAffected versions
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- primekey ejbcabefore 7.4.3
Same product
primekey: all recordsOther highest-scoring records for the same primary product.
- CVE-2022-34831An issue was discovered in Keyfactor PrimeKey EJBCA before 7.9.0, related to possible inconsistencies in DNS identifiers submitted in an…39Monitor
- CVE-2020-11630An issue was discovered in EJBCA before 6.15.2.6 and 7.x before 7.3.1.2.39Monitor
- CVE-2020-11627An issue was discovered in EJBCA before 6.15.2.6 and 7.x before 7.3.1.2.35Monitor
Published before and after this one in the same product
- ← EarlierCVE-2020-11631Apr 7, 2020 · An issue was discovered in EJBCA before 6.15.2.6 and 7.x before 7.3.1.2.26Monitor
- ← EarlierCVE-2020-25276Sep 11, 2020 · An issue was discovered in PrimeKey EJBCA 6.x and 7.x before 7.4.1.29Monitor
- Later →CVE-2021-40086Aug 24, 2021 · An issue was discovered in PrimeKey EJBCA before 7.6.0.8Monitor
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · patch commit or PR link · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- A low-privileged account is enough.
- No user action is required.
- No special conditions are required; it is repeatable.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- none
- Integrity
- low · data or configuration can be modified
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- Low
- Privileges required
- Low
- User interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- None
- Integrity impact
- Low
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-295 · Improper Certificate ValidationCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
A certificate validation error is silently swallowed instead of terminating the connection. Often, code added for a test environment makes its way into production.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-295 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
override fun checkServerTrusted(chain: Array<X509Certificate>, type: String) {
// Left empty for the test environment
}Fixed
val client = OkHttpClient.Builder()
.certificatePinner(
CertificatePinner.Builder()
.add("api.sirius.example", "sha256/…")
.build()
).build()Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
ATT&CK techniques
—
Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.