CVE-2020-26230: Deanonymization of COVID-19 positive users of Radar COVID
Noroxi assessment
Priority: Monitor (action score 21/100)
- The sources we track (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei, GitHub) show no public exploit code or exploitation in the wild.
- Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 1.6% (FIRST EPSS); higher than 77.1% of all records.
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it. No account or password is required. A user must open a link or visit a page. Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
- No fixed version is recorded, but the references include a patch (commit or PR) link.
- Severity is disputed: the assigning authority (CNA) scores it 7.4, NVD 5.3.
Low priority for now. See the fix and affected versions sections below.
Generated automatically from the record's data: CVSS (NVD and CNA), CISA KEV and SSVC, FIRST EPSS, exploit sources, fixed versions. How we calculate it
Primary sources: NVD · CVE.org · FIRST EPSS
Radar COVID is the official COVID-19 exposure notification app for Spain. In affected versions of Radar COVID, identification and de-anonymization of COVID-19 positive users that upload Radar COVID TEKs to the Radar COVID server is possible. This vulnerability enables the identification and de-anonymization of COVID-19 positive users when using Radar COVID. The vulnerability is caused by the fact that Radar COVID connections to the server (uploading of TEKs to the backend) are only made by COVID-19 positives. Therefore, any on-path observer with the ability to monitor traffic between the app and the server can identify which users had a positive test. Such an adversary can be the mobile network operator (MNO) if the connection is done through a mobile network, the Internet Service Provider (ISP) if the connection is done through the Internet (e.g., a home network), a VPN provider used by the user, the local network operator in the case of enterprise networks, or any eavesdropper with access to the same network (WiFi or Ethernet) as the user as could be the case of public WiFi hotspots deployed at shopping centers, airports, hotels, and coffee shops. The attacker may also de-anonymize the user. For this additional stage to succeed, the adversary needs to correlate Radar COVID traffic to other identifiable information from the victim. This could be achieved by associating the connection to a contract with the name of the victim or by associating Radar COVID traffic to other user-generated flows containing identifiers in the clear (e.g., HTTP cookies or other mobile flows sending unique identifiers like the IMEI or the AAID without encryption). The former can be executed, for instance, by the Internet Service Provider or the MNO. The latter can be executed by any on-path adversary, such as the network provider or even the cloud provider that hosts more than one service accessed by the victim. The farther the adversary is either from the victim (the client) or the end-point (the server), the less likely it may be that the adversary has access to re-identification information. The vulnerability has been mitigated with the injection of dummy traffic from the application to the backend. Dummy traffic is generated by all users independently of whether they are COVID-19 positive or not. The issue was fixed in iOS in version 1.0.8 (uniform distribution), 1.1.0 (exponential distribution), Android in version 1.0.7 (uniform distribution), 1.1.0 (exponential distribution), Backend in version 1.1.2-RELEASE. For more information see the referenced GitHub Security Advisory.
- Published
- Nov 13, 2020
- Updated
- Jun 16, 2026
- EPSS
- 1.6% · 77th percentile
- CWE
- CWE-200
Report tools
Action score
21
Low priority for now.
- CVSS
- 21 / 40 · 5.3 / 10
- CISA KEV
- 0 / 30 · Not listed
- EPSS
- 0 / 30 · 1.6%
CNA vs NVD score
- NVD
- 5.3
- CNA · GitHub_M
- 7.4
- 2.1 point gap
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
The score given by the assigning authority versus NVD’s independent score. A gap means the severity is contested.
Get told when this record changes
- Not in KEV: no record of exploitation in the wild
- No public exploit code on record
- No fixed version yet
If any of these changes, we'll tell you in the daily email digest.
Is your version affected? Check itNoroxi analysis
What does it mean in your environment?
The assessment above is generated automatically from the record's data; it doesn't know your environment. Our team verifies on your systems whether this vulnerability is actually exploitable and which mitigation is enough.
We use this product, ask for helpAffected systems
Is your version affected?
Pick the product and type the version you run. It's compared with this record's version ranges in your browser; the version isn't sent anywhere.
| Vendor | Product | CPE |
|---|---|---|
| radarcovid | radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server | cpe:2.3:a:radarcovid:radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server |
| radarcovid | radarcovid | cpe:2.3:a:radarcovid:radarcovid |
Versions reported by the vendor
Affected version ranges reported by the assigning authority (GitHub_M). Independent of NVD's CPE analysis and usually ahead of it.
RadarCOVID radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server
- iOS version < 1.0.8, Android version < 1.0.7, Backend < 1.1.2-RELEASEaffected
Affected versions · NVD (4)
NVD version ranges (for catalog products). Add the product to your stack with a version and matching uses these.
- radarcovid radar-covid-backend-dp3t-serverbefore 1.1.2
- radarcovid radarcovidbefore 1.0.7
- radarcovid radarcovidbefore 1.0.8
- radarcovid radarcovidbefore 1.1.0
Remediation
Which version to upgrade to
Fix versions compiled from the vendor, package registries and Microsoft. Verify the vendor's note before upgrading.
No fix version is recorded for this entry. Check the references for vendor advisories.
Exploit status
No known public exploit
No public exploit has been observed yet. That doesn't mean you're safe, only that the bar is a little higher.
Research context
For pentesters and researchers: attack profile, score disagreement, timeline, patch commits, credits, variant and chain candidates, bug bounty scope. All derived from existing data; no exploit code.
Timeline
From publication to today: proof of concept, Metasploit module, CISA KEV and fix record. Dates are as reported by the sources.
No dated events beyond publication.
Patch and commit links
Commit, PR and diff links among the references. A starting point for patch-diffing and variant hunting; fixes, not exploits.
- RadarCOVID/radar-covid-androidcommit 09d00e5
- RadarCOVID/radar-covid-androidcommit 5325277
- RadarCOVID/radar-covid-androidcommit 7fdc7de
- RadarCOVID/radar-covid-androidcommit 8e5d14e
- RadarCOVID/radar-covid-androidcommit 91dcfff
- RadarCOVID/radar-covid-androidcommit 9627f4d
- RadarCOVID/radar-covid-androidcommit ea0c4cc
- RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-servercommit 6d30c92
- RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-servercommit c37f816
- RadarCOVID/radar-covid-ioscommit 2d1505d
Not on record for this CVE: EPSS history · researcher credit · variant or chain candidate · public bounty program.
Technical details
Attack conditions
- Anyone who can reach it over the internet can trigger it.
- No account or password is required.
- A user must open a link or visit a page.
- Special conditions such as timing or configuration are required.
If successful
- Confidentiality
- high · data can be read
- Integrity
- none
- Availability
- none
- Attack vector
- Network
- Attack complexity
- High
- Privileges required
- None
- User interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality impact
- High
- Integrity impact
- None
- Availability impact
- None
Weakness class (CWE)
CWE-200 · Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized ActorCVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
nvd-primary
Root cause
The extension requests broader permissions than its function needs and sends the data it collects out for purposes beyond its stated function.
The bug in code
The whole CWE-200 classA representative example of this vulnerability class. Not the vendor's source code; it shows the faulty pattern and its fix.
Vulnerable
{
"permissions": ["tabs", "<all_urls>"],
"background": { "service_worker": "analytics.js" }
}Fixed
{
"permissions": ["activeTab"],
"host_permissions": ["https://yildiz.example/*"]
}Attack context
MITRE CAPEC attack patterns and ATT&CK techniques for this weakness class (CWE). A starting point for detection rules and threat hunting.
Attack patterns (CAPEC)
- ExcavationCAPEC-116likelihood: High · Medium
- Subverting Environment Variable ValuesCAPEC-13likelihood: High · Very High
- FootprintingCAPEC-169likelihood: High · Very Low
- Exploiting Trust in ClientCAPEC-22likelihood: High · High
- FingerprintingCAPEC-224likelihood: High · Very Low
- ICMP Echo Request PingCAPEC-285likelihood: Medium · Low
- TCP SYN ScanCAPEC-287Low
- Enumerate Mail Exchange (MX) RecordsCAPEC-290Low
ATT&CK techniques
- System Service DiscoveryT1007
- System Network Configuration DiscoveryT1016
- Remote System DiscoveryT1018
- System Owner/User DiscoveryT1033
- Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or LocationT1036.005
- Network Service ScanningT1046
- System Network Connections DiscoveryT1049
- Process DiscoveryT1057
- Permission Groups DiscoveryT1069
- System Information DiscoveryT1082
- File and Directory DiscoveryT1083
- Account DiscoveryT1087
- Multi-Factor Authentication InterceptionT1111
- Peripheral Device DiscoveryT1120
- System Time DiscoveryT1124
- Access Token Manipulation:Token Impersonation/TheftT1134.001
Change log (0)
No changes recorded on tracked fields yet. Score, KEV, exploit maturity and fix status changes appear here.
References
Show all references (10 more)Show less
- github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/53252773ffa81e116deabcbbea3bac96872b9888
- github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/7fdc7debeb8a37faa77b53d9f9a1b4bbcff445ce
- github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/8e5d14ec60e0c1847a4733556cf34d232c27102c
- github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/91dcfff6252055637bc9ee0c46b8f003d64a16b9
- github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/9627f4d69705bca68e550eefd3df1b9abe90b215
- github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-android/commit/ea0c4cc837f72f58e2b5df1ecf0899743ec3cdf8
- github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/commit/6d30c92cc8fcbde3ded7e9518853ef278080344d
- github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/commit/c37f81636250892670750e3989139fd76d4beffe
- github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-backend-dp3t-server/security/advisories/GHSA-w7jx-37x3-w2jx
- github.com/RadarCOVID/radar-covid-ios/commit/2d1505d4858642995ea09f02f23c953acaa65195
Vendor advisories and official records. Exploit/PoC links are deliberately left out.